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I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 2 of the Sherman Act states:
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any otherperson or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
$10,000,000 dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.'

* Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. J.D.
1975, B.S. 1971 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
** Associate, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio. J.D. 1989, M.B.A. 1989, B.S.
1985 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
1. Sherman Act, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (emphasis added) (original version at 26 Stat. 209
(1890)).
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Section 2 is a criminal statute, as it carries a felony sanction for the
delineated offenses of (1) monopolization, (2) attempt to monopolize, and
(3) conspiracy to monopolize.2
The elements and appropriate scope of the "attempt to monopolize"
offense have long been some of the most perplexing and controversial areas
of antitrust jurisprudence. The central controversy is whether "dangerous
probability of success" should be an element of an attempt to monopolize,
and if so, what constitutes a dangerous probability of successful monopolization. Legal commentators have lined up on both sides of the issue,
supporting either the "classic" approach, which requires dangerous
probability, or the "expansionary" approach, which does not.3
2. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW $ 600, at 1 (1978). Congress substantially
changed the penalty provisions in 1974. 88 Stat. 1708 (1974). Under the original § 2, violations
were misdemeanors, punishable by a maximum fine of $5,000 and maximum imprisonment of one
year, or both, without distinction between individuals and corporations. Sherman Act, § 2, 26
Stat. 209 (1890). Congress increased the maximum fine for § 2 violations in 1955 from $5,000 to
$50,000. 69 Stat. 282 (1955). In 1990, Congress raised the maximum fines to $10 million for
corporations, and $350,000 for individuals. Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101588.
Although the Sherman Act is a criminal statute, § 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "any
person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws" (which include the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Wilson Tariff Act),
may recover in a private action: (1) treble damages, (2) costs, and (3) attorney's fees. Clayton
Act, §§ l(a), 4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12(a), 15 (1982) (original version at 38 Stat. 730 (1914)). Today,
private damage suits greatly outnumber government prosecutions. H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS
AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW

§

14.1, at 356 (1985). Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, this

article usually designates both the prosecution and private plaintiffs in antitrust suits as "plaintiffs" and both government prosecutions and private suits as "claims." The same principles are,
unless otherwise noted, applicable to both types of suits.
3. The following legal commentary supports the "classic" approach to attempted monopolization, which requires dangerous probability of success: 3 P. AREEDA & D.TURNER, supra note
2, $ 833, at 339-43; H. HOVENCAMP, supra note 2, § 6.3, at 164-70; Cooper, Attempts andMonopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section 2, 72 MICH. L.
REv. 373 (1974); Turner, The Scope of "Attempt to Monopolize," 30 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 487,
488 (1975). Note that in his article Professor Turner repudiates an apparently expansionist position taken in Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARv. L. REV. 281, 305
(1956). See id. at 506 n.21.
In contrast, the following scholarly opinions support an "expansionary" view of the attempted
monopolization offense, which does not require a dangerous proximity to actual monopolization:
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST

§

51, at 137-38 (1977); Baker, Section 2

Enforcement - The View from the Trench, 41 ANTITRUST L.J. 613, 620 (1972); Ponsoldt, Clarifying the Attempt to Monopolize Offense as an Alternative to Protectionist Legislation: The Conditional Relevance of "DangerousProbability of Success," 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1109 (1986);
Comment, Attempt to Monopolize: DangerousProbability of Success as an Obstacle to Enforcing
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 289 (1982); Note, Attempt to Monopo-

1990)

MONOPOLIZATION AND THE SHERMAN ACT

Justice Holmes started the dispute with his 1905 opinion, Swift & Co. v.
United States.4 Using this case as authority, all of the United States appellate courts - with the possible exception of the Ninth Circuit - include
dangerous probability of successful monopolization as an element of a
primafacie case of an attempt to monopolize.
The thesis of this article is that dangerous probability of success is not
and should not be an element of an attempted monopolization claim. Swift
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not unambiguously established dangerous probability as an element of an attempt to monopolize.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has not substantively addressed the attempt
clause since 1951,1 and has steadfastly refused to grant certiorari in a
number of pressing cases that could have been used to resolve the issue.6
Because of the lack of Supreme Court guidance, the error of lower
courts has not been so much in their reliance upon Swift as precedent, but
rather in their method of applying Swift. In their search for a "black letter
rule" in the language of the Swift opinion, the courts have lost sight of the
main theme underlying the opinion - attempt to monopolize should be
analyzed as a criminal attempt, consistent with general principles of substantive criminal law relating to attempt crimes.
The modem general criminal law of attempt teaches that dangerous
probability of success is not an independent element of an attempt offense.
Instead, it is one method of distinguishing acts that constitute an attempt
from those that do not. Most significantly, however, modem authority rejects the requirement of dangerous probability of success because it diverts
attention from the nature of the actor and the nature of the actor's conduct
and is inconsistent with the purposes of attempt law.
By ignoring modem developments in the substantive law of criminal
attempts, the courts have divorced the offense of attempt to monopolize
from its roots. They consequently have created a cause of action that not
lize Underthe ShermanAct: Defendant'sMarket Poweras a Prerequisiteto a PrimaFacie Case, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 1451 (1973).
Both sides of the issue are explored in Debate: Should the Sherman Act Be Amended to
Broaden the Offense of Attempt to Monopolize?, 48 ANTrrRusT L.J. 1433 (1979) [hereinafter
Debate].
4. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
5. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
6. See, eg., United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1122 (1977), discussed infra in text accompanying notes 277-80. John Shenefield, former
Associate Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, and
chairman of a presidential commission to review the antitrust laws, once noted his concern that
"if the Court had not taken Empire Gas, they probably would never take any case at all." Debate,
supra note 3, at 1437.
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only is archaic in terms of criminal law jurisprudence, but also is ineffective
in carrying out antitrust policy. The blanket dangerous probability requirement creates a huge gap in Sherman Act enforcement by immunizing from
antitrust scrutiny or liability virtually all anticompetitive activity by single
firms not already possessing market power approaching monopoly.
Part II of this article presents an overview of the completed offense of
monopolization and its corresponding attempt offense, including the split in
the circuit courts over the proper use of dangerous probability of success.
Part III analyzes Swift & Co. v. United States and a sampling of subsequent
Supreme Court opinions to demonstrate that Supreme Court precedent on
the dangerous probability question is, at best, ambiguous. In light of this
ambiguity, Part IV analyzes the development of the substantive law of
criminal attempts to demonstrate that dangerous probability should not be
an element of the attempt offense and suggests how attempted monopolization should be framed to remain true to its criminal law roots. Part V explores the antitrust policy reasons which show why the courts should
reconstruct attempted monopolization to conform to modem attempt law.
Finally, Part VI discusses various classes of conduct which prosecutors and
private plaintiffs often allege as attempted monopolization and suggests
ways to analyze such conduct in accordance with the illuminated principles
of attempt law and antitrust policy.
II.

MONOPOLIZATION AND ATrEMPTS TO MONOPOLIZE:
ORIGINS AND ELEMENTS

A.

Monopolization

As defined by the Supreme Court, the offense of monopolization has two
distinct elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident." 7
The Supreme Court defined "monopoly power" as "the power to control prices or exclude competition." 8 This definition follows classical economics, which teaches that in a market with only one seller, the monopolist
will maximize profits (at a level in excess of total profits in a competitive
market) by charging prices higher (with lower total output) than if the market was competitive. A monopolist can maintain these supracompetitive
7. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
8. United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
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prices and profits only if it can exclude other competitors from the market. 9
Monopoly power is an extreme form of single-firm market power - the
power to affect market prices or exclude competitors from the market."0

To measure market power in monopolization cases, courts initially require the plaintiff to define the relevant market in which the defendant allegedly holds monopoly power. 1
The relevant market has two
components: (1) a relevant product market,12 and (2) a relevant geographic
market. 1 3 After defining the relevant market, courts assess a firm's market
power by computing the firm's share of sales or output within that market.
In addition to market share, the fact finder also may consider a host of

structural and other factors indicating the firm's power in the relevant market, such as: barriers to entry; number and size of other competitors; degree
of competition present in the market; actual ability of the firm to affect

market prices or exclude competitors; ability of the firm to implement price
discrimination; excessive profits, margins, or prices for the firm; and the
firm's absolute size. 14 Because of these other factors, the market share nec9. See generally2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2,
402-03; H. HOVENKAmP, supra
note 2, §§ 1.1-1.2; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, §§ 7-8.
10. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 3.1, at 55; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 7, at 30.
11. This approach to measuring market power originated with Judge Learned Hand's opinion
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Supreme Court has
adopted and refined the approach, as have the lower courts. E.g., Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563;
E.L Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377.
12. For discussions of the judicial approach to defining the relevant product market, see H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, §§ 3.2-3.4; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, §§ 12-18.
13. For discussions of the judicial approach to defining the relevant geographic market, see
H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 3.5; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, §§ 19-20.
14. For case and commentators' discussions of how these factors affect a firm's market power,
see McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co., 858 F.2d 1487 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (barriers to entry,
including trade secrets, patents, licenses, capital outlays required, excess capacity by existing competitors, price elasticity, and difficulties of buyers in changing suppliers) cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2110(1989); International Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 792 (2d
Cir. 1987) (strength of the competition, probable development of the industry, barriers to entry,
and elasticity of consumer demand), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987); Shoppin' Bag of Pueblo,
Inc. v. Dillon Cos., 783 F.2d 159, 162 (10th Cir. 1986) (aggressive competition by other competitors, market trends, number and strength of other competitors, entry barriers, consumer sensitivity to price changes, and the firm's absolute size); National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting
Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 1985) (inability to control prices and exclude competitors);
Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 756 F.2d 1183, 1190-91 (5th Cir. 1985) (actual ability
to control prices and exclude competitors); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732
F.2d 480, 490 (5th Cir. 1984) (concentration of the market, barriers to entry, price elasticity of
demand, strength of competition, consolidation trends); J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting
Co., 704 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1983) (difficulty of buyers switching between suppliers and other
entry barriers); Olsen v. Progressive Music Supply, Inc., 703 F.2d 432, 437 (10th Cir. 1983) (aggressive competition by another competitor), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983); Richter Concrete
Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 826-27 (6th Cir. 1982) (actual power to control
prices and exclude competition and degree of competition in the market); Lektro-Vend Corp. v.
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essary to constitute monopoly power is impossible to determine exactly.
Nevertheless, courts generally hold that market shares in the range of seventy to one hundred percent indicate monopoly power.1 5
Monopolization requires both possession of monopoly power in a relevant market and willful acquisition or maintenance of that power. Thus,
being a monopolist in and of itself is not illegal. Monopolization requires
affirmative conduct that helps the monopolist to acquire or maintain monopoly power, and which goes beyond simply winning the competitive
struggle through a superior product, good business practices, or historical
accident.1 6 In other words, monopolization requires conduct other than
competition on the merits - anticompetitive or exclusionary practices.
Professor Hovenkamp notes that courts have found the following practices sufficient to constitute monopolization when practiced by a firm with
monopoly power: (1) espionage or sabotage, (2) mergers, (3) reduction of
output, (4) expansion of capacity or output, (5) price discrimination, (6)
vertical integration, (7) tying arrangements, (8) refusals to deal, (9) supply
or price "squeezes," (10) predatory or "manipulative" research and development, (11) failure to predisclose research and development, (12) patent
Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 271 (7th Cir. 1981) (increasing concentration in industry), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 921 (1982); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1357 (5th
Cir. 1980) (number of other competitors, entry barriers, limited size of market, and actual power
over price), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron,
Inc., 562 F.2d 365, 373 (6th Cir. 1977) (firm holds a patent); United States v. Empire Gas Corp.,
537 F.2d 296, 305-07 (8th Cir. 1976) (barriers to entry and actual ability to raise prices or exclude
competitors), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, l
508-16 at 331-46 (excess returns, excess margins, price discrimination, actual conduct in controlling prices or excluding competitors); H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 3.7 (price discrimination
and excessive profits); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, §§ 22-32 (market concentration, entry barriers,
actual conduct of firm in controlling price and excluding competitors, excessive profits, price discrimination, and absolute size of the firm).
15. Professor Hovenkamp cites numerous cases and concludes:
[Courts] fairly consistently hold that a 90% market share is enough to support the necessary inference of market power. Several courts have found a market share on the order of
75% to be sufficient, but if the share is lower than 70% courts become much more reluctant to find monopoly power. Some courts hold as a matter of law that a share of less than
50% is insufficient, even if the defendant clearly had the power to raise its price by reducing output.
H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 5.2, at 139-40 (footnotes omitted); see also REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS

49 (1955)

(analyzing Supreme Court cases that found monopoly power by firms with market shares of seventy to one hundred percent).
16. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
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abuses, including fraud, patent "accumulation," and refusal to
license, (13)
17
predatory pricing, and (14) vexatious or repetitive litigation.
B. Attempt to Monopolize
The law governing attempted monopolization is rooted in the Supreme
Court's 1905 opinion, Swift & Co. v. United States.'" In that case, the government prosecuted meat packers and dealers controlling about sixty percent' 9 of all sales of fresh meat in the United States, alleging, inter alia,
attempted monopolization of the fresh meat market."0 The government alleged that the defendants had agreed to bid up prices in the livestock markets in order to induce shipments to the stockyards, and then to not bid
against each other in subsequent purchases; to fix their selling prices and
restrict sales; to establish uniform credit rules; to keep and enforce a black
list; to fix cartage charges for delivery of their meats; and to secure unlawfully low freight rates from the railroads. 2 1 The trial court enjoined the
meat packers' practices.22 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants
argued that their intent in making the agreements was wholly irrelevant if
their acts were otherwise lawful. Justice Holmes' answer was as follows:
[The several acts charged] are bound together as the parts of a single
plan. The plan may make the parts unlawful. The statute gives this
proceeding.., against attempts to monopolize .... Intent is almost
essential to such an attempt. Where acts are pot sufficient in themselves to produce a result which the law seeks to prevent, - for
instance, the monopoly - but require further acts in addition to the
mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an intent to bring it
to pass is necessary in order to produce a dangerous probability that
it will happen. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Massachusetts 267,
272. But when that intent and the consequent dangerous probability
exist, this statute, like many others and like the common law in
some cases, directs itself against that dangerous probability as well
as against the completed result.2 3
The courts have drawn the elements of attempted monopolization directly from Justice Holmes' above-quoted language: (1) specific intent to
17. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 5.6, at 146. For more comprehensive discussions of the
conduct requirement, see 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 625-30; H. HOVENKAMP,
supra note 2, §§ 5.3-5.6; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, §§ 33-48.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

196 U.S. 375 (1905).
Id. at 391.
Id. at 390-93.
Id. at 394-95.
Id. at 393 n.1.
Id. at 396.
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attain monopoly power, (2) anticompetitive or exclusionary acts directed
toward accomplishing that intent, and (3) a dangerous probability of success in achieving monopoly power.24
1. Specific Intent and Anticompetitive Conduct
Although monopolization requires only general intent - intent to do
the acts that constitute the offense - attempted monopolization requires a
specific intent to monopolize.25 Specific intent in this context is somewhat
illusory and contradictory. On one hand, courts state that specific intent is
intent to gain monopoly power - the power to control prevailing market
prices or to exclude competitors. 26 Thus, specific intent to monopolize requires an intent to control prevailing market prices or to exclude competitors from the market.2 7 On the other hand, courts state that intent to
prevail over rivals or survive the competitive struggle is not sufficient to
establish specific intent to monopolize, because that is the motive behind all
legitimate competition. 2 Therefore, specific intent can be understood only
24. On attempts to monopolize, see generally ABA ANTITRUST SEcTION, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 139-44 (2d ed. 1984 & 2d Supp. 1983-1988)[hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS]; 3 P.
820-36 at 311-55 (1978 & P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 111
Supp. 1988); H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, ch. 6; 2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW ch.
13 (1980 & Supp. 1989); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, §§ 50-52.
25. The Supreme Court stated that "[w]hile the completed offense of monopolization under
§ 2 demands only a general intent to do the act.... a specific intent to destroy competition or
build monopoly [power] is essential to guilt for the mere attempt .. " Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.
148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945) (the attempt offense requires "specific intent," which is "an
intent which goes beyond the mere intent to do the act"); DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 139;
H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.2, at 161; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 51, at 135. For a
discussion of the distinction between general and specific intent in the criminal law, see 1 W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 3.5 (1986).
26. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of monopoly power.
27. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 139; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.2, at 162.
28. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supranote 2, 1 822a; DEVELOPMENTS, supranote 24, at 139
n.198; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.2, at 161-63. The Ninth Circuit stated that "[t]he mere
intention ... to exclude competition ... is insufficient to establish specific intent to monopolize
.... To conclude otherwise would contravene the very essence of a competitive marketplace
which is to prevail against all competitors." Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d
665, 670 (9th Cir. 1980). Likewise, the Third Circuit said:
In proving specific intent, a mere intention to prevail over rivals or improve market
position is insufficient. Even an intent to perform acts that can be objectively viewed as
tending toward the acquisition of monopoly power is insufficient, unless it also appears that
the acts were not "predominantly motivated by legitimate business aims."
Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n., 745 F.2d 248, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v United States, 345 U.S. at 584, 627 (1953)), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1016 (1985); see also Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 814 (9th Cir. 1976)
("Where the conduct is justified by legitimate business reasons or merely exemplifies a healthy
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in conjunction with the conduct requirements of monopolization and its
attempt offense. Like monopolization, 29 attempted monopolization also requires some anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct beyond competition
on the merits, which is designed to achieve monopoly power.30 Thus, the
specific intent required for attempted monopolization is intent to achieve
monopoly power through the use of anticompetitive or illegitimately exclusionary means.3 1 Although direct evidence of the defendant's intention can
establish specific intent to monopolize,3 2 the most probative evidence of specific intent to monopolize - intent to achieve monopoly power through the
use of anticompetitive or illegitimately exclusionary conduct - is the defendant's conduct. Therefore, courts allow the trier of fact to infer specific
intent to monopolize from the defendant's acts that satisfy the conduct element of attempted monopolization.3 3
The types of conduct that constitute attempted monopolization are the
same types of conduct that constitute monopolization if done by a firm with
monopoly power.3 4 However, conduct amounting to monopolization if
pursued by a monopolist may not constitute an attempt to monopolize if
pursued by a firm with less market power.35 This result suggests that a
defendant's market power often is a key factor in determining whether challenged conduct is actually anticompetitive, illegitimately exclusionary, or
designed to achieve monopoly power. Therefore, further discussion of the
attempted monopolization conduct requirement will be postponed pending
spirit of competition, an intent to monopolize is more difficult to support."), cerL denied, 433 U.S.
910 (1977).
29. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
30. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 825-30 (1978 & P. Areeda & H.
Hovenkamp Supp. 1988); H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.6; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 51,
at 135-37.
31. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 822a. Therefore, the specific intent element
of attempted monopolization encompasses both an intent to do the prohibited acts and an intent

to achieve the prohibited result of the monopolization offense.
32. Technically, direct evidence of state of mind is nonexistent -

state of mind can be in-

ferred only from a person's words or actions. But in the context of attempted monopolization,
courts speak of direct evidence of specific intent as encompassing the defendant's written or spoken words regarding intention, as distinguished from evidence of intent inferred from the defendant's conduct.
33. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 139-40; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.2, at 16263; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 51, at 135.
34. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; see also sources cited supra note 30.
35. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 827, at 321, 829; H. HOVENKAMP, supra
note 2, § 6.6, at 171; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 51, at 135-36. The Ninth Circuit stated that
"the same aggressive conduct which is seen only as a reaction to competition by a small firm may
suggest intent to monopolize where carried out by a firm with a significant market power." Janich
Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 854 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 829 (1978).
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be held liable for an attempt to monopolize unless the illegitimate conduct
designed to achieve monopoly power has a dangerous probability of giving
the defendant monopoly power.
In determining dangerous probability of success, the majority courts
look to the defendant's market power at the time of the alleged attempt and
generally require a significant amount of market power as a prerequisite to a
dangerous probability of success. 39 As in monopolization cases, 4° these
courts use share of the relevant market as wel as structural and other factors as proxies for market power. Because the majority approach relies
heavily upon the defendant's market share as an indicator of market power
and dangerous probability of success, defining the market the defendant is
allegedly attempting to monopolize, and showing the defendant's share of
that market, are both elements of the plaintiff's primafacie case.4 1 Therefore, failure to allege or present sufficient evidence to determine the relevant
market, or the defendant's share of that market, is fatal to the plaintiff's
case.4 2 Should the plaintiff overcome this hurdle, the court may still find
that the defendant's market share is inadequate, as a matter of law, to present a dangerous probability of success.
Tel. Directory Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 849 F.2d 1336, 1341, 1348 (11th Cir.
1987); National Indep. Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Charter Fin. Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1396, 1402
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1056 (1985); D.C. Circuit: Neumann v. Reinforced Earth
Co., 786 F.2d 424, 427-30 (D.C. Cir. (1986)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986); Federal Circuit:
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
39. On the dangerous probability of success element of attempted monopolization, market
power, and relevant market under the majority approach, see generally 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, % 831, 835; DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 140-42; 2 E. KJNTNER, supra
note 24, § 13.4; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.5.
40. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
41. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 141.
42. See Dow Chem. Co., 847 F.2d at 1184 (summary judgment); Ad-Vantage TeL Directory
Consultants,Inc., 849 F.2d at 1340-41 (reversed judgment on appeal); Neumann, 786 F.2d at 42930 (j.n.o.v.); Burns Clinic Medical Center, 779 F.2d at 1176 (summary judgment); Olsen, 703 F.2d
at 437 (summary judgment); NationalFarmers Org., 687 F.2d at 1192 (judgment by court); Aviation Specialties,Inc., 568 F.2d at 1192-93 (summary judgment); Spectrofuge Corp., 575 F.2d at
276-77 (reversed jury verdict and judgment on appeal); H & B Equip. Co., 577 F.2d at 242-43
(directed verdict); FLM Collision Parts,Inc., 543 F.2d 1019(summary judgment); E. Delaney
Corp., 525 F.2d at 306-07 (reversed judgment on appeal); Scranton Constr. Co., 494 F.2d at 783
(summary judgment); Kreager 497 F.2d at 471 (summary judgment); Agrashell, Inc., 479 F.2d at
286 (reversed judgment on appeal); Mackey, 237 F.2d at 873 (dismissed complaint); see also 3 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 835c, at 348.
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As in monopolization cases,4 3 consideration of structural and other factors bearing upon market power" prevent the formulation of specific rules
outlining the market share necessary for a dangerous probability of successful monopolization.4 5 Additional factors further cloud any such judgment
in attempt cases. First, some types of conduct are inherently more anticompetitive than others, meaning that less initial market power is necessary for
a dangerous probability of successful monopolization." Second, courts
often use hindsight in determining whether the defendant's conduct
presented a dangerous probability of successful monopolization - considering whether the defendant's share rose or fell while pursuing the challenged conduct.4 7 Nevertheless, Professors Areeda and Turner state that
the courts often find market shares of ten percent or less inadequate, and
shares of forty percent or more adequate, as a matter of law, to support a
finding of a dangerous probability of successful monopolization.4 8

43. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text; see also 3 P. AREEDA & D.
note 2, 835c, at 348.

TURNER,

supra

44. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 11-27 (2d Supp. 1983-1988).
45. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 835c, at 348; 2 E. KINTNER, supra note 24,

§ 13.4, at 423.
46. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.5, at 169; see 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note

2,

834b.
47. See Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 845 F.2d 404, 409 (2d Cir. 1988)
(jury could find dangerous probability where defendant's share rose from 55% to 100%); General
Business Sys. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 1983) (25% and declining
market share could not support dangerous probability of success; upheld dismissal of complaint);
Richter Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d at 826 (upheld directed verdict for defendant whose market
share fell from 40% to 30%); Lektro- Vend Corp., 660 F.2d at 270-71 (no dangerous probability of
success where defendant's market share fell from 33% to 24%); Nifty Foods Corp., 614 F.2d at
841 (summary judgment for defendant whose market share fell from 54.5% to 33%); see also
Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 1980) (large and
increasing market share, under proper circumstances, could demonstrate market power), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981). But cf. McGahee, 858 F.2d at 1506 & n.45 (reversed summary
judgment for defendant despite fact that market share fell from 65% to 35%); General Indus.
Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1987) (dangerous probability found despite defendant's lower market share); Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 99192 (5th Cir. 1983) (upheld jury verdict and judgment for plaintiff despite fact that defendant's
market share fell from almost 100% to 38%), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); Greyhound
Computer Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977) (declining
market share may reflect an absence of monopoly power but does not foreclose such a finding),
cert denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978). For a discussion of the significance of rising and falling market
share, see P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 835.1 (Supp. 1988).
48. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 835c. Professor Cooper has suggested as a
practical matter that firms with market shares in the vicinity of thirty percent or more "should
start to worry about attempt liability." E. Cooper, Dangerous Probability and Market Share
Analysis in Attempts to Monopolize 13 (unpublished paper delivered at the Southwest Legal
Foundation, February 12, 1976) (quoted and cited in 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2,
835c, at 349 & n.15). For cases finding dangerous probability of success, see Northern Propane
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The Ninth Circuit and Dangerous Probability of Success
Traditional Approach
The first departure from the majority approach to dangerous probability

of success in attempted monopolization cases was the Ninth Circuit's 1964
case, Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.49 In that case, a retail gasoline dealer
brought suit against an oil company alleging, inter alia, that the oil company had attempted to monopolize a part of interstate commerce by imposing resale price maintenance, exclusive dealing, and tying arrangements on
its dealers with respect to petroleum products, tires, batteries, and automotive accessories. 0 The trial court entered summary judgment for the oil

company on the attempted monopolization claim."1 On appeal, the oil
company argued for affimance on the ground that the dealer had failed to

present sufficient evidence of a relevant market or the oil company's market
share, thereby precluding a showing of dangerous probability of success in
the alleged attempt to monopolize. 2 In rejecting this argument, the Ninth
Circuit stated:
We reject the premise that probability of actual monopolization
is an essential element of proof of attempt to monopolize. Of course,
such a probability may be relevant circumstantial evidence of intent,
but the specific intent itself is the only evidence of dangerous
probability the statute requires - perhaps on the not unreasonable
assumption that the actor is better able than others to judge the
practical possibility of achieving his illegal objective.

Gas Co., 858 F.2d at 1506 (60%-65% range); HartzMountain Corp., 810 F.2d at 806 (75%-90%
range); Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d at 851 (100%); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704,
720 & n.26 (7th Cir. 1979) (95%), cerL denied,445 U.S. 917 (1980); Kearney & Trecker Corp., 452
F.2d at 598 (33%). For cases finding no dangerous probability of success, see Indiana Grocery,
Inc., 864 F.2d at 1414 (50%); InternationalDistrib. Centers, Inc., 812 F.2d at 792 & n.4 (17%);
Shoppin'Bag of Pueblo, Inc., 783 F.2d at 161 (34%-38% range); Hennessy Indus., Inc. v. FMC
Corp., 779 F.2d 402,403,404-05 (7th Cir. 1985) (less than 15%); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc., 732
F.2d at 490-91 (4%); Transource Int'l, Inc. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 725 F.2d 274, 283-84 (5th Cir.
1984) (less than 10%); J.T. Gibbons, Inc, 704 F.2d 787, 790, 796 (less than 10%); Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 581 F.2d 1068, 1080 (3d Cir. 1978) (increased from 9.2% to 15.5%);
YoderBros, Inc., 537 F.2d at 1368, cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977) (20%); Empire Gas Corp.,
537 F.2d at 305-07 (50%); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d
547, 555 (1st Cir. 1974) (3%), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975); White Bag Co., 579 F.2d at
1386-87 (9%); Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1968) (20%), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 961 (1969). These cases suggest that Professors Areeda, Turner, and Cooper
may underestimate the market share necessary to reach a jury on the dangerous probability issue.
49. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
50. Id. at 463.
51. Id. at 474.
52. Id.; see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
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When the charge is attempt... to monopolize, 5rather
than mo3
nopolization, the relevant market is "not in issue.",
As to why the relevant market is not at issue in an attempt case, the
court noted:
Section 2 prohibits attempts to monopolize "any part" of commerce, and a dominant position in the business of distributing petroleum products and TBA was not necessarily prerequisite to ability to
attempt to monopolize an appreciable segment of interstate sales in
such products. If the jury found that Tidewater intended to fix the
price at which 2,700 independent service station operators resold
gasoline, and to exclude other suppliers of petroleum products and
sponsored TBA items from competing for the patronage of these operators, and took steps to accomplish that purpose, it could properly
conclude that Tidewater attempted to monopolize a part of interstate commerce in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.54
Subsequent Ninth Circuit opinions were far from clear or consistent in
their interpretation and application of Lessig. For example, some panels
stated that dangerous probability of success was no longer an element of the
attempt offense."5 The consensus, however, seemed to be that although
dangerous probability of success was still an element of the attempt offense,
the trier of fact could infer from a specific intent to monopolize. 6 Because
53. Lessig, 327 F.2d at 474 (footnotes and citations omitted).
54. Id. at 474-75 (footnotes and citations omitted).
55. Greyhound Computer Corp., 559 F.2d at 504; Knutson, 548 F.2d at 814.
56. Support for this view and the principles outlined in the text following this note is found in
the language and holdings of the following cases: Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1184,
1192 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1213 (1985); Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d
1207, 1213-14 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1007 (1985); Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984);
General Business Sys. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965, 975-76 (9th Cir. 1983); Cascade
Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet & Millwork, Inc., 710 F.2d 1366, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1983); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1057-58 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 849 (1983); Aurora Enters., Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 688 F.2d 689, 695-96 (9th
Cir. 1982); Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 887 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1085 (1983); Forro Precision, Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045,
1059 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1130 (19.85); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles
0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1308-09 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982); Portland
Retail Druggists Ass'n v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 662 F.2d 641, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1229 (1985); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
668 F.2d 1014, 1027-31 (9th Cir. 1981) (excellent summary and explanation of Ninth Circuit
approach), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); California Steel & Tube v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 650
F.2d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 1981); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 845 (9th Cir.
1980); Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d at 925-26; Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil,
610 F.2d 665, 668-70 (9th Cir. 1980); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Business
Mach. Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1979); Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., 601
F.2d 429, 453 n.47 (9th Cir. 1979); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 390-91 (9th Cir.
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the trier of fact could in turn infer specific intent from the defendant's challenged conduct,57 the Ninth Circuit's prime focus became identifying the

types of conduct sufficient to allow the trier of fact to infer both specific
intent and dangerous probability of success.5 8 If the challenged conduct

was not sufficient to allow such inferences, then the plaintiff could prove
that the defendant held enough market power to present a dangerous

probability of successful monopolization.

9

Proof of significant market

power coupled with the challenged conduct could then establish dangerous
probability of success and allow the trier of fact to infer specific intent."
Alternatively, if the plaintiff could present independent, direct proof of specific intent, the trier of fact could infer dangerous probability of success

from the specific intent coupled with the challenged conduct. 1
Summarizing the Ninth Circuit's approach, a plaintiff may satisfy the
specific intent element of the attempt offense by (1) direct evidence of specific intent, (2) inference from certain types of conduct, or (3) inference

from less egregious types of conduct coupled with proof of significant market power. A plaintiff may establish the dangerous probability element by
(1) proof of market power, (2) inference from certain types of conduct those types allowing inference of specific intent, or (3) inference from direct
proof of specific intent. Two categories of conduct may satisfy the conduct
1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d
848, 853-54 (9th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
57. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. "[The existence of specific intent may be
established not only by direct evidence of unlawful design, but by circumstantial evidence, principally of illegal conduct.... This court has made it clear that the nature of such conduct varies
with the conditions of the market and the characteristics of the defendant." Inglis, 668 F.2d at
1027 (citations omitted).
58. "The conduct element of the attempt claim also is closely related to the other two elements. Thus .... specific intent to control prices or exclude competition may be inferred from
certain types of conduct.... [D]angerous probability of success also is often dependent on proof
of conduct." Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1030.
59. "Proof of market power in the defendant may be relevant... because it may serve as
sufficient direct proof of dangerous probability of success." Id. at 1029 n. 11. Proving dangerous
probability by market power is the same as proving dangerous probability under the majority
approach. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
60. "However, '[o]rdinarily specific intent is difficult to prove,' and thus more commonly it is
shown indirectly by proof of illegal conduct and, where necessary, market power." California
Computer Prods., Inc., 613 F.2d at 737 (citation omitted and emphasis added).
61. Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1029;
[O]ur more recent decisions make plain that the permissibility of inferring dangerous
probability from proof of specific intent is conditional. That is, a dangerous probability of
success may be inferred either (I) from direct evidence of specific intent plus proof of
conduct directed to accomplishing the unlawful design, or (2) from evidence of conduct
alone, provided the conduct is also the sort from which specific intent can be inferred.
Iad (footnotes omitted); see also Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d at 926 n.3.
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element of attempted monopolization: (1) conduct which allows inference
of specific intent and dangerous probability, and (2) less egregious conduct
which requires either proof of market power or direct proof of specified
intent to establish both dangerous probability of success (or inference of
dangerous probability) and specific intent (or inference of specified intent).6 2
Under this approach, a preliminary step for any attempted monopolization case was categorizing the challenged conduct as (1) evidencing specific
intent and dangerous probability on its face, or (2) needing further evidence
of specific intent and dangerous probability. The Ninth Circuit grouped
two kinds of conduct in the first category: (a) conduct forming the basis for
a substantial claim of restraint of trade, or (b) conduct clearly threatening
to competition or clearly exclusionary.6 3
Conduct forming the basis for a substantial claim of restraint of trade
refers to violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.64 Because this conduct, by definition, violates Section 1, the Section 2 attempt claim is superfluous, except in those cases in which the conduct would violate Section 1
but for the absence of the concerted activity required by that section.65
Conduct clearly threatening to competition or clearly exclusionary
came to include several types of conduct that the Ninth Circuit regarded as
62. "[E]vidence of conduct is indispensable even when there is direct evidence of unlawful
specific intent." Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1030.
63. Id. at 1029 n.ll.
64. Id. at 1028. This sort of conduct will probably serve as a shortcut method of establishing
dangerous probability of success and specific intent only for per se violations of § 1 - violations
established solely by the existence of an agreement. All other § I challenges are judged under a
rule-of-reason standard, which requires an analysis of the effects on competition of the challenged
agreement - an analysis that inevitably requires inquiry into the defendant's market power, much
like that done in monopolization and attempted monopolization cases. See L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 3, §§ 68-69. On § 1, the rule of reason, and per se violations, see generally L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 3, §§ 63-72. The Ninth Circuit has recognized this distinction between perse and ruleof-reason § 1 violations and their role in inferring specific intent and dangerous probability of
success in attempted monopolization cases. "Since 'under the rule of reason market definition is
required to establish a § 1 violation,' such evidence is necessary where specific intent is sought to
be shown by inference unless a per se violation of § 1 is made out." CaliforniaComputer Prods.,
613 F.2d at 737 n.10. "Proof of market power in the defendant may be relevant in establishing the
requisite unreasonable conduct ...." Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1029 n. 11.
65. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits only "[e]very contract, combination .... or conspiracy in restraint of trade." Sherman Act, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982)) (emphasis added). In contrast, § 2 contains no concerted action requirement
and, therefore, reaches unilateral conduct. Section 2 reaches "[ejvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize." Id. § 2 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit recognizes the
significance of unilateral conduct which would otherwise violate section 1 and its role in attempted monopolization claims. "We depart from the standards under section I to the extent
necessary to evaluate the conduct of a single firm that would escape liability under section 1
because of that section's limitation to concerted or contractual activity." Cascade Cabinet Co.,
710 F.2d at 1374 n.3.
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so anticompetitive that it could be condemned without further inquiry into
specific intent or dangerous probability of success. The types of conduct
included in these various categories are discussed later in this article.6 6
4.

The Ninth Circuit and Dangerous Probability of Success
Recent Approach

-

The previous discussion outlined the Ninth Circuit's traditional approach to dangerous probability of success. Several recent cases, however,
suggest that the Ninth Circuit is altering its approach to dangerous
probability of success to bring it more in line with the majority position.
The first case to reveal this trend was Drinkwine v. FederatedPublications,
Inc.67 In that case, the court listed the three elements of attempted monopolization.6 8 The court mentioned that the fact finder may infer specific intent from certain types of conduct, but failed to mention that dangerous
probability of success also may be inferred from these same types of
conduct.6 9
In the Ninth Circuit's next attempt case, Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Foundation,Inc. ,70 a group of veterinarians brought an antitrust suit
against a nonprofit organization that published a registry of dogs susceptible to certain eye diseases, claiming that the organization's requirement that
dogs be examined by veterinarians certified by the American College of Veterinary Ophthalmologists violated the antitrust laws.71 The organization
counterclaimed that the suit was baseless and merely an effort to drive the
registry out of business. 2 The trial court granted summary judgment for
the registry on its counterclaim, finding the suit a sham and an attempt to
monopolize.7 3
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the veterinarians' suit was baseless and,
therefore, a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 4 The court found
sufficient evidence of both specific intent to monopolize and anticompetitive
conduct in the veterinarians' efforts to keep lay persons from running a
7
registry; their threats of litigation giving effect to this intentY.
Under previ66. See infra Part VI.
67. 780 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1087 (1986).
68. Id. at 740.
69. Id. This result might be explained by the fact that the court dismissed the case on specific
intent grounds alone. Id.
70. 783 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986).
71. Id. at 1331.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1335.
75. Id.
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ously announced principles governing attempted monopolization in the
Ninth Circuit, dangerous probability of success could be inferred from
either (1) the Section 1 violation (which could satisfy the conduct requirement and establish specific intent), or (2) the direct evidence of the veterinarians' specific intent to monopolize coupled with their anticompetitive
conduct. 76 Nevertheless, the court held that in the absence of proof of market dominance by the veterinarians, the registry could not establish a dangerous probability of successful monopolization. 7
Next, in Catlin v. Washington Energy Co.,78 the Ninth Circuit upheld
summary judgment for the defendant on an attempted monopolization
claim on the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiff had presented inadequate
proof of the relevant market and, therefore, could not establish dangerous
probability of success. 79 The court did not discuss alternative means of establishing dangerous probability, but discussion of the issue was unnecessary in light of the court's previous holding that there was neither evidence
of specific intent to monopolize nor evidence of anticompetitive conduct in
the record. 0
In Syufy Enters. v. American Multicinema, Inc.,"1 the court again used
dictum to cast doubt upon its previous attempted monopolization jurisprudence. The court upheld a jury verdict finding, inter alia, attempted monopolization by a defendant with a sixty to sixty-nine percent share of the
relevant market.8 2 This market share led the court to uphold the jury's
finding that the defendant held monopoly power."' The court also upheld
the jury's finding of attempted monopolization, but the opinion included
the following footnote:
The question whether "dangerous probability of success" is an
element of attempted monopolization appears to have generated a
measure of confusion in this circuit. Because of its large market
share, Syufy cannot seriously argue that AMC's attempted monopolization claim fails on the ground that AMC failed to prove "danger-

76. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text. The Rickards court acknowledged this.

Rickards, 783 F.2d at 1335.
77. Id. The court relied heavily upon an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, Forro Precision, Inc.
v. International Business Mach. Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,471 U.S. 1130
(1985). In that case, however, the defendant's actions were found not to be baseless or a sham
and, therefore, were immune from antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 1061.
78. 791 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986).
79. Id. at 1348.
80. Id.
81. 793 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).

82. Id. at 996, 999-1000.
83. Id. at 996.
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ous probability of success." For this reason, we need not address the
question 8 whether
proof of "dangerous probability of success" is
4
required.
The next attempt ease again presented the Ninth Circuit with a chance
to undermine its prior holdings. In Rutman Wine Co. v. E & J Gallo Winery,"5 the court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's attempt
claim against a defendant holding a twenty-five to thirty-three percent market share.8 6 Although the court held that the complaint contained insufficient allegations of specific intent and anticompetitive conduct, it added
that "[a]n allegation of monopoly power... may be an implicit requirement
of attempted monopolization's third prong relating to the dangerous
probability of success. [Plaintiff's] Section 2 claim cannot lie because it
lacks an allegation that [the defendant] possesses monopoly power in the
87
relevant ... market. 1
In summary, although many older Ninth Circuit decisions announce
principles that depart from the majority approach to dangerous probability
of success, 88 the Ninth Circuit's most recent opinions indicate that at least
some members of the court may be willing to adopt the majority position. 9
III.

THE SUPREME COURT AND DANGEROUS

PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS

The law of attempted monopolization in the various circuit courts of
appeals has been described by one commentator as "chaotic and full of
loopholes" and "in substantial disarray," leading to "a situation in which
the courts do not know what the standard is, [and] businessmen do not
know what the standard is." 9 This result is not surprising given the sparse,
ambiguous, and inconclusive nature of Supreme Court precedent on the
subject. The root of the problem is, as previously noted,9 1 the Court's 1905
84. Id. at 999 n.13 (citations omitted).
85. 829 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1987).
86. Id. at 731-32.
87. Id. at 736 (citation omitted).
88. See authorities cited supra note 56.
89. The Ninth Circuit's most recent attempt cases do not indicate any consensus in this regard. For example, Thurman Indus., Inc. v. Pay 'N Pak Stores, Inc., 875 F.2d 1369, 1378-80 (9th
Cir. 1989), follows the traditional Ninth Circuit approach and contains an excellent discussion of
the proper role of market evidence in characterizing ambiguous conduct. But other cases, such as
United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 671 n.21 (9th Cir. 1990) and Image Technical Serv.,
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 619-21 (9th Cir. 1990), seem to treat market power as an
indispensable element in all attempt cases.
90. Debate, supra note 3, at 1435, 1447, 1449 (remarks of John H. Shenefield).
91. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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opinion in Swift & Co. v. United States,92 from which the lower courts have
directly drawn the elements of attempted monopolization, including dangerous probability of success.93 A close examination of Justice Holmes' language reveals that he was not elevating dangerous probability of success to
the status of a separate, independent element of attempted monopolization:
Where acts are not sufficient ... to produce a result which the law
seeks to prevent,... an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order
to produce a dangerous probability that it will happen. But when
that intent and the consequent dangerous probability exist, this statute ... directs itself against that dangerous probability .... 9'
The defendants contended that intent was not sufficient to convert
otherwise lawful acts into crimes,9" and therefore, Justice Holmes, in the
above-quoted passage, was focusing upon the intent element of attempted
monopolization. He characterized the dangerous probability of success as a
direct consequence of the requisite intent element, not as a separate and
independent element. The lower courts' subsequent search for a "black letter rule" of attempted monopolization has produced a "dangerous
probability of success" element mandated neither by the language nor the
holding of the Swift opinion.9 6
In American Tobacco Co. v. United States,97 the Court quoted the trial
court's jury instruction that "[t]he phrase 'attempt to monopolize' means
the employment of methods, means and practices which would, if successful, accomplish monopolization, and which, though falling short, nevertheless approach so close as to create a dangerous probability of it .... ,,98
Although this statement supports the proposition that dangerous
probability is an element of the attempt offense, it is, nevertheless, dicta
because the grant of certiorari in that case limited the Court's review to
"the question whether actual exclusion of competitors is necessary to the
92. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
93. The relevant language from the Swift opinion is quoted supra text accompanying note 23.
94. Swift & Co., 196 U.S. at 396 (emphasis added and citation omitted).
95. Id. For a more complete discussion of the Swift case, see supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
96. Others have noted this problem. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1029 n.8 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Oetiker v.
Werke, 556 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474 & n.46 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 51(b), at 137 ("Justice
Holmes merely identifies the dangerous probability of monopoly as the rationalewhich underlies
the legal requirement that there be a specific intent to monopolize before an attempt is found.");
see also Ponsoldt, supra note 3, at 1116-18; Comment, supra note 3, at 299; Note, supra note 3, at
1454.
97. 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
98. Id. at 785 (emphasis added).

1990]

MONOPOLIZATION AND THE SHERMAN ACT

crime of monopolization under [Section] 2 of the Sherman Act." 99 Thus,
the trial court's instructions on attempt were not being reviewed and the

opinion discussed only the monopolization convictions.l" °
In the context of a conspiracy to monopolize case, United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,' 0° the Court emphasized that Section 2 prohibits conspiracies
to monopolize "any part" of interstate commerce, without considering
what percentage of that part of commerce is affected." 2 As applied to attempted monopolization, this supports the proposition that market share,
and therefore, dangerous probability of success is not essential to the
offense. 103

In United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,"~ the Court confronted an at-

tempted monopolization case, but failed to clarify its position regarding
dangerous probability of success. In that case, the United States sought to

enjoin the defendant's acquisition of a competitor on grounds that it violated Section 1 and Section 2 by attempting to monopolize the fabricated
steel products market.10 The trial court dismissed the complaint,1 6 on the
grounds that the acquisition was reasonable under Section 1,107 and that the
government had not8 shown that the defendant would hold post-acquisition
10
monopoly power.
99. Id. at 784. On this question, the court held actual exclusion was not necessary to constitute monopolization. Id. at 813-15.
100. Other commentators have noted that American Tobacco should not be read to support
the majority position. See Ponsoldt, supranote 3, at 1118-19; Comment, supra note 3, at 292 n.15;
Note, supra note 3, at 1456-57.
101. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
102. Id. at 225-26 (emphasis added)
It follows that the complaint in this case is not defective for failure to allege that CCM has
a monopoly with reference to the total number of taxicabs manufactured and sold in the
United States. Its relative position in the field of cab production has no necessary relation
to the ability of the appellees to conspire to monopolize or restrain, in violation of the Act,
an appreciable segment of interstate cab sales.
Id. at 226. Support for this view is also found in United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 254
U.S. 255, 269-70 (1920). The Ninth Circuit also relied on this interpretation in originally rejecting
dangerous probability of success as an element of attempted monopolization. Lessig, 327 F.2d
459, 474-75, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). Professors Areeda and Turner reject this construction of the statute, arguing that it could equally apply to the monopolization offense, but the
Supreme Court nevertheless requires monopoly power in a relevant product and geographic market for the monopolization offense. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 833c.
103. See Note, supra note 3, at 1455.
104. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
105. Id. at 497.
106. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 74 F. Supp. 671, 672 (D. Del. 1947), aff'd, 334 U.S.
495 (1948).
107. Id. at 680.
108. Id. at 680-81.
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When considering the attempt charge, the Supreme Court stated that
"the trial court applied too narrow a test to this charge; even though the
restraint effected may be reasonable under [Section] 1, it may constitute an
attempt to monopolize forbidden by [Section] 2 if a specific intent to monopolize may be shown.""
The Court then considered evidence of the
defendant's specific intent, including the defendant's market share." 0
Thus, the Court's opinion, though unclear, may mean that market share
and dangerous probability of success are not independent elements of the
attempt offense, but may be relevant in ascertaining whether the defendant
possesses the requisite specific intent to monopolize.
In Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,"' the Court addressed an attempted monopolization case in which a newspaper previously enjoying a
"substantial monopoly" ' " 2 attempted to drive a new radio station out of
business by refusing to accept advertisements from merchants who also advertised on the radio station. In this case, the defendant clearly presented a
dangerous probability of success because its boycott, if successful, would
have reestablished its monopoly position. The Court cited Swift's "dangerous probability" language for the proposition that to establish attempt liability "it is not necessary to show that success rewarded appellant's attempt
to monopolize.""' 3 As noted by one commentator:
Nowhere in its decision, however, does the Court expressly indicate
that such a dangerous probability is a separate co-requisite of an
attempt charge or that in all attempt situations a showing of specific
intent, found here in the boycott, 14would be insufficient of itself to
carry plaintiff's claim to the jury."

The action made unlawful by Section 2 of the Statute is the monopolization of or attempt to monopolize an appreciable part of commerce or trade. No attempt to control an
appreciable part of commerce or trade could be a monopolization or attempt to monopolize unless the proportion of control by the party so attempting had some measurable relation to the subject matter within the given area. This area may be of restricted extent, but
there must be some yardstick or measure of computation by which the interference with
trade or commerce may be designated either, on the one hand, as an attempt to monopolize
or, on the other, as a lawful business effort.
Id. The court acknowledged the Supreme Court's Yellow Cab holding, but nonetheless thought
that "[i]t
must be true, however, that the proportional effect of a given action must have a bearing
as to whether a monopoly has either been accomplished or intended." Id. at 680.
109. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. at 531-32.
110. Id. at 533.
111. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
112. Id. at 150.
113. Id. at 153.
114. See Note, supra note 3, at 1457.
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In Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,11 5 the Court again
addressed an attempt to monopolize case, but disposed of it on specific intent grounds alone. The Court never addressed the dangerous probability
116
of success question.
In United States v. E.I Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,11 the government
maintained a civil action against Du Pont for monopolization, attempt to
monopolize, and conspiracy to monopolize trade in cellophane.1 1 After
judgment was entered for Du Pont on all issues, the government appealed
only the monopolization ruling, arguing that the relevant product market
should have been cellophane rather than all flexible packaging materials. 1 9
The Court rejected this narrow market definition in part because the cases
cited by the government for the proposition that Section 2 monopolies may
exist over limited products in narrow fields dealt only with conspiracies and
attempts to monopolize. 120 The Court's tacit approval of the cited cases is
support for the proposition that a narrower or less rigorous examination of
relevant market and market shares is required in attempt to monopolize
cases. Under this approach, dangerous probability of successful monopolization, at least as applied by the majority courts,12 1 is not an indispensable
element of attempted monopolization.
A case often cited 122 for the proposition that market definition and,
therefore, dangerous probability of success are indispensable to an attempt
to monopolize claim is Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. FoodMachinery
& Chemical Corp.123 In this case, the defendant in a patent infringement
suit filed a counterclaim alleging that enforcement of the patent, allegedly
procured through fraud on the Patent Office, constituted monopolization in
violation of Section 2.124 The Court, reversing the two lower courts, held
that fraudulent procurement of a patent may violate Section 2 if the other
elements of a Section 2 case are present, 125 and a person injured by such a
violation may sue for treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.

115. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
116. Id. at 626-27.
117. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
118. Id. at 378.
119. Id. at 379.
120. Id. at 395 n.23.
121. See supra Part II.B.2.
122. See, e.g., Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269, 285-86 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert denied, 414 U.S. 1022 (1273).
123. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
124. Id. at 173-74.
125. Id. at 174.
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In considering the claim, dismissed on the pleadings by both lower
courts, 12 6 the Court said:
To establish monopolization or attempt to monopolize a part of
trade or commerce under [Section] 2 of the Sherman Act, it would
then be necessary to appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal
patent claim in terms of the relevant market for the product involved. Without a definition of that market there is no way to measure [defendant's] ability to lessen or destroy competition.... This is
a matter of proof ....
Although this language, requiring market definition and analysis of defendant's power, has been interpreted as an implied endorsement of the
dangerous probability requirement, two points should be noted. First,
Walker was a monopolization case; the attempt language is therefore
dicta.128 Second, the language quoted above must be read in conjunction
with that which immediately follows in the Court's opinion:
[Plaintiff] has not clearly articulated its claim. It appears to be based
on a concept of per se illegality under [Section] 2 of the Sherman
Act. But in these circumstances, the issue is premature.... [T]he
area of per se illegality is carefully limited. We are reluctant to extend it on the bare pleadings and
absent examination of market effect
129
and economic consequences.
Thus, the Court's discussion regarding the need for market analysis may
merely state that such analysis is required to determine whether enforcement of a fraudulently procured patent should be a per se violation 3 ° of
Section 2.131 The Court therefore remanded the case, noting that "even
though the per se claim fails at this stage of litigation, we believe that the
case should be remanded for [Walker] to clarify the asserted violations of
[S]ection 2 and to offer proof thereon."' 3 2 Walker has therefore been char126. Id.
127. Id. at 177-78.
128. Other commentators have noted that the attempt reference is "gratuitous." Ponsholdt,
supra note 3, at 1121 n.59; Comment, supra note 3, at 299; Note, supra note 3, at 1458.
129. Walker ProcessEquip., Inc., 382 U.S. at 178. The Court remanded the case to allow the
plaintiff to articulate its claim more clearly and offer evidence in support of its § 2 claim. Id.
130. Presumably, aperse violation in this context would mean that the conduct alone would
constitute an attempt to monopolize, without any further inquiry into the defendant's specific
intent to monopolize or dangerous probability of successful monopolization. See 2 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 2, 314b, at 47-48. This would be similar to the traditional Ninth Circuit
approach, which allowed the trier of fact to infer both specific intent and dangerous probability
from certain types of conduct, without any further proof. See supra part II.B.3.
131. Others have noted this ambiguity in the opinion. See, e.g., Oetiker, 556 F.2d at 6-7 &
n.15.
132. Walker Process Equip., Inc, 382 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added).

1990]

MONOPOLIZATION AND THE SHERMAN ACT

acterized not as a decision defining the requirements of a Section 2 case, but
rather as a case "deferring such a decision until the proper vehicle

arrived."

133

As the foregoing survey indicates, the Supreme Court has provided very
little, often ambiguous, and somewhat conflicting guidance on the issue of
dangerous probability of success, as well as the necessity of proof of relevant
market and defendant's market share in attempt to monopolize cases. The

Court also has steadfastly refused to definitively resolve the issue,1 34 even
when presented with "some very pressing cases."' 135 It is not surprising,
therefore, that the most recent word on the Court's approach to attempted
monopolization is contained in a dissent from a denial of certiorari of a
1983 Ninth Circuit case, Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp.136 Justice White dissented,137 noting that the Ninth Circuit allowed attempted monopolization
findings without definition of a relevant market for certain types of conduct. 138 He also quoted dicta from a Supreme Court case suggesting that
39

conduct violates Section 2 only when it threatens actual monopolization. 1

Justice White, therefore, would have granted certiorari in the case because
of "[t]he questionable validity of the doctrine on which the decision of the

Ninth Circuit in this case rested and the longstanding conflict among the
Circuits over the issue."' 4 It is interesting to note that virtually all Ninth
Circuit attempted monopolization opinions issued since Justice White's
133. Hangards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 921, 923 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
134. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
135. Comment, supra note 3, at 289.
136. 721 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1007 (1985).
137. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Blanton, 471 U.S. 1007 (1985) (White, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1007-08 (White, J., dissenting).
139. Sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act are directed to different sorts of threats to competition in our economy. Section 1 proscribes concerted action - contracts, combinations,
and conspiracies in restraint of trade. Such concerted action is so inherently threatening to
competition that in certain instances it is forbidden without regard to whether it has actually damaged competition in a particular market. Section 2 regulates unilateral conduct by
outlawing monopolization and attempted monopolization. Because unilateral conduct is
far less likely than concerted action to pose a threat to competition, "[t]he conduct of a
single firm is governed by § 2 alone and is unlawful only when it threatens actual
monopolization."
Id. at 1008 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984)). The Copperweld case held that a parent and its whollyowned subsidiary were legally incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § 1. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777. Therefore, the above-quoted language from Copperweld was clearly
dictum.
140. Mobil Oil Corp., 471 U.S. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting).
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criticism of their approach to dangerous probability contain indications that
the Ninth Circuit may be moving toward the majority approach."'
IV.

THE SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW OF ATTEMPTS AND
DANGEROUS PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS

Given the sparse and ambiguous nature of Supreme Court precedent,
courts should look elsewhere to determine whether dangerous probability of
success should be an element of the attempt offense. The most logical starting point for analysis is the general substantive criminal law of attempts.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, though it provides civil remedies, is a criminal statute,142 and like most criminal attempt statutes, it merely condemns
the "attempt" to commit the substantive offense without further elaboration. 14 3 As Justice Holmes recognized in Swift & Co. v. United States, the
judiciary has traditionally defined the contours of attempt law, and attempted monopolization should be no exception. Indeed, the authority
Holmes cited for his much-quoted language" is a common law criminal
attempt case, Commonwealth v. Peaslee,145 an opinion he wrote while sitting
on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Although the courts' 4 6 and commentators' 47 generally recognize that
attempted monopolization is rooted in the common law of criminal attempts, inexplicably, most do not look to criminal attempt law to resolve
the dangerous probability of success controversy. 14 In their exclusive focus on the language of the Swift opinion, courts have virtually ignored a
vast body of general criminal attempt law. Scholarship in that area has
clarified the purposes of the attempt offense, and has produced a well-re141. See supra Part II.B.4.
142. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
143. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 1, at 299-300 (1985).

144. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
145. 177 Mass. 267, 59 N.E. 55 (1901).
146. See, e.g., United States v. United Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1116-21 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1001 (1985); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Kearney &
Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 598 & nn.44-48 (7th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
147. See, e.g., 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 820, at 311, 822b, at 316, 833b,
at 339-40; DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 140, H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 160; L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 51(b).
148. A notable exception is Professor Sullivan. He thinks that "the best way to confine the
attempt offense within appropriate bounds is to confine it within the limits of the common law
concepts which it utilizes." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 51(b), at 138. Professor Ponsoldt also
argues that the attempted monopolization offense be interpreted in accordance with modem criminal law attempt principles. Ponsoldt, supra note 3, at 1139-44.
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fined approach to the elements of the offense. As developed below, the dangerous probability of success controversy can easily be resolved by
examining the developments in, and the modem approach to, general criminal attempts.
A.

The Purposes of Attempt Law

The first step in defining the contours of the attempt offense is to ask
why the law condemns attempts to commit substantive offenses.149 One
major function of the attempt crime is prevention. To prevent the commission of a substantive offense, the law needs a basis to intervene before the
actor actually has committed the completed crime. 5
A second major function of the attempt crime is punishment. A person
who attempts to commit a crime demonstrates a disposition toward criminal activity and a dangerous character. The unsuccessful attempt demonstrates that the person may present a continuing danger; therefore, it is
appropriate to subject that person to the corrective forces of the law in order to rehabilitate the person and protect the public."' 1
A third major function of attempt law is equality of treatment. If an
actor attempts to commit a crime and fails due to a fortuity, it is inequitable
to exculpate that person on this ground alone.1 52
Finally, deterrence, although a major goal of many areas of criminal
law, has, at best, only a minimal role in attempt law. Because the actor, by
making an attempt, has already demonstrated an intent to commit the substantive offense despite the threat of its sanctions, the threat of sanctions for
the attempt is not likely to further deter the actor. 53
The dominant purpose of attempt law is retribution. Criminal law
scholars have long debated whether attempt doctrine should be concerned
more with the dangerousness of the actor's conduct, governed by objective
criteria (with the purpose of prevention or deterrence), or by the actor's
dangerous character (with the purpose of punishment). However, modem
authorities agree that the proper focus of attempt law should be upon the
149. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2(b), at 499-500 (2d ed. 1986).
150. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 introduction, at 294 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra
note 149, § 6.2(b), at 498.
151. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 introduction, at 294 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra
note 149, § 6.2(b), at 499.
152. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 introduction, at 294 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra
note 149, § 6.2(b), at 499.
153. MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5 introduction, at 293-94 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT,
supra note 149, § 6.2(b), at 499.
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154
actor's dangerous character as evidenced by an intent to commit a crime.
Therefore, the problem of attempt law is to define the point at which the
actor has sufficiently demonstrated a dangerous character that should be

1 55

punished.

B.

Mens Rea

To possess the dangerous character that attempt law punishes, the actor
must possess an intent to commit a crime. In the context of attempted
monopolization, the completed crime is monopolization which requires, as
do many crimes, 156 acts causing a result (certain anticompetitive or illegitimately exclusionary acts which give or maintain monopoly power) plus
some mental state (general intent to commit the prohibited acts which
maintain or give monopoly power). 157 General attempt law, therefore, indicates that the intent required for attempted monopolization is intent to
achieve monopoly power by committing the prohibited acts. If an actor has

154. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 1, at 298 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
supra note 149, § 6.2, at 495. Much of the confusion in discussions of attempted monopolization
can be attributed to an improper assumption that prevention and deterrence of monopolization,
rather than retribution, are the dominant, and perhaps only, purposes of attempted monopolization. See, e.g., Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1027 ("By analogy to the law of criminal attempt, the requirement of specific intent is used to confine the reach of an attempt claim to conduct threatening
monopolization." (emphasis added)); Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919,
925 (9th Cir. 1980) ("[One must keep in mind the central purpose of the attempt offense - to
discourage unilateral activity that.., could result in the acquisition of monopolypower." (emphasis
added)), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.5, at 169 ("In all
cases it is important to remember that the attempt offense is designed to reach conduct likely to
create a monopoly." (emphasis added)). Indeed, the very existence of a dangerous probability of
success requirement rests upon this faulty assumption. Cf. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 140
("The majority rule, rooted in the common law of attempts, views the attempt offense under
Section 2 as adjunct to the basic statutory purpose ofprohibitingactual monopolization and hence
requires that there be a dangerous probability of success." (emphasis added)). Professors Areeda
and Turner recognize the punishment purpose of criminal attempt law, but reject it in the context
of attempted monopolization on the basis of another faulty assumption - there can be no attempt
offense for general intent crimes. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 822b, at 316. For
an explanation of their faulty assumption, see infra note 160.
Professor Sullivan is perhaps unique in his appreciation of the role of punishment in the law of
attempted monopolization:
[T]he common law of attempts... does not insist that the criminal actor be within range of
success, but only that he have externalized his unlawful animus in a deliberate effort to
bring it to actuality. Once he has done that, the law steps in on the ground that by deliberately trying to commit the crime, the actor has shown a serious risk that if not deterred he
may persist in his efforts until he succeeds.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 51(b), at 137-38.
155. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 1, at 298 (1985).
156. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT'r, supra note 149, § 6.2(c)(1), at 500.
157. See supra Part II.A.
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manifested a purpose to engage in the prohibited conduct of anticompetitive
and illegitimately exclusionary acts in order to bring about the prohibited
possession of monopoly power condemned by the substantive offense of monopolization, then the actor has exhibited a dangerousness sufficient to warrant criminal sanction. 153 This is the classic specific intent of the criminal
law - intent to do acts to achieve a result, rather than merely the general
intent to do the acts constituting the crime. 159 The specific intent element
of attempted monopolization is formulated to correspond exactly with these
16
general principles of criminal attempts.
C. Conduct
As in criminal law generally, 61 attempt law does not punish for bad
thoughts alone.1 62 The attempt requires some act in furtherance of the
wrongful intent. The problem in this context is that if a person has the
requisite specific intent to commit a crime, then what acts in pursuit of that
intent should be necessary to constitute an attempt? In the language of the
courts, the difficulty is distinguishing the attempt from acts of mere "preparation," which do not constitute an attempt.1 63 Over time, the courts have
developed various criteria to determine when conduct constitutes an attempt. Exploring these tests brings the dangerous probability of success
controversy in attempted monopolization cases into very sharp focus.

158. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 2, at 301, 303 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, supra note 149, § 6.2(c)(1).
159. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 2, at 301 n.8 (1985); see generally W. LAFAVE &
A. ScoTt, supra note 149, § 3.5(e).
160. See supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text. Professors Areeda and Turner reject the
retribution purpose of attempt law in the context of attempt to monopolize because they believe
that "[w]hen the intention to do wrong is not part of the completed offense, it should play no role
in an attempt offense." 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, § 822b, at 316; see supra note
154. They are mistaken in their belief that intention to do wrong is not an element of the monopolization offense. General intent to do the acts constituting the offense is required. See supra note
25 and accompanying text. The acts constituting the monopolization offense are certain anticompetitive and illegitimately exclusionary acts which establish or maintain monopoly power. See
supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. An intent to do such acts could fairly be characterized
as an intent to do wrong. If Areeda and Turner mean to say that there should be no attempt
offense for general intent crimes, their assumption is equally faulty. Even for strict liability
crimes, which require no mens rea, an actor can be guilty of attempting such a crime if she acts
with an intent to bring about the result prohibited by the strict liability crime. W. LAFAVE & A.
Scorr, supra note 149, § 6.2(c)(3), at 502-03.
161. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 149, § 3.2.
162. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 1, at 298 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra

note 149, § 6.2(d), at 503-04.
163. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 149, § 6.2(d), at 504.
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1. The Proximity Approaches
One of the conduct tests used by courts is the "last proximate act" test.
Under this test, the actor has committed an attempt if he has done everything he believes necessary to commit the intended crime." 6 All modem
authorities agree that committing the last proximate act is sufficient to constitute an attempt, but none would require that the actor go this far to be
punished for attempt.1 6 The last proximate act is the paradigmatic attempt
of the criminal law - for example the intended assassin whose shot misses
the would-be victim. Because such clear-cut cases are rare, 1 66 the law must
usually look elsewhere for the dividing line between preparation and

attempt.
Another of the proximity tests is the "indispensable element" test,
which seeks to identify some indispensable aspect of the completed crime.
An actor who completes this aspect of the crime is close enough to success
to be punished for the attempt. 167
A third proximity test is the "physical proximity" test. This approach
focuses upon the relation of the actor's conduct to the completed crime in
terms of time, distance, and the number of necessary acts remaining undone. The strictest version of this test states that acts are merely prepara16
tion until the actor has the apparent power to complete the crime.
164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 4 at 321 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, supra
note 149, § 6.2(d)(1), at 504-05.
165. W. LAFAVE & A. Scotr, supra note 149, § 6.2(d)(1), at 505. The Model Penal Code
adopts the last proximate act test as sufficient, but not a necessary basis for an attempt. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(a)-(b) & comment 4 (1985).
166. A notable exception in the context of attempted monopolization is American Airlines,
743 F.2d 1114. In that case, the president of American Airlines called the president of rival
Braniff, and proposed that the two airlines fix their fares for Dallas flights. Braniff's president
refused to accept this proposal, and subsequently turned a tape recording of the conversation over
to the Justice Department. Id. at 1115-16. The Fifth Circuit stated that American's offer, if
accepted, would have constituted an illegal price fixing agreement in violation of § 1. In addition,
the court noted that given the two companies' joint share of 76% of all passengers on Dallas
flights in a market with high entry barriers, acceptance would also have constituted a joint monopolization of the Dallas flight market. Id. at 1116, 1118-19. Given this conclusion, the court
held that American's offer to fix prices was the last proximate act before commission of the completed offense, and therefore, American was guilty of attempted monopolization. Id. at 1118-19
("[American's] proposal was an act that was the most proximate to the commission of the completed offense that [American] ... was capable of committing."). Id.
For other examples of how the last proximate act could occur in the context of attempted
monopolization, see 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 826.
167. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 5(c) at 323 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTr,
supra note 149, § 6.2(d)(1), at 505.
168. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 5(a) at 321 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT,
supra note 149, § 6.2(d)(1), at 505-06.
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The physical proximity test is part of a broader "dangerous proximity"
test. This test examines the gravity of the intended crime, the nearness to
completion of the crime, and the probability that the actor's conduct will
result in the intended crime. The greater the gravity and probability, and
the nearer to completion, the more likely the actor's conduct is an
attempt.

169

The dangerous proximity test is familiar because it is the basis of Justice
Holmes' "dangerous probability" language in Swift. " Indeed, the writings
and opinions of Justice Holmes are the foundation of this test. 17 1 There-

fore, Swift does not stand for the proposition that dangerous probability of
success is a separate and distinct element of the attempted monopolization
offense. Rather, the simple teaching of Swift is that courts should construe
the attempted monopolization offense in accordance with the criminal law
of attempts.' 7 2 Under the criminal law, dangerous probability of success is
not an element of the attempt offense; it is merely one way to distinguish
acts of preparation from an attempt.
This distinction - one approach to defining the conduct element versus
the separate and distinct element - becomes important when one considers
that modem authority rejects all of the various proximity tests as a proper
approach to defining conduct constituting an attempt. The proximity approaches focus upon deterring undesirable behavior; if the conduct is not
sufficiently dangerous, there is no reason to deter it.' 73 But, as discussed
above,' 7 4 modem attempt law is not designed to provide deterrence; rather
attempt law focuses primarily upon the dangerousness of the actor, not the
dangerousness of the acts. Nevertheless, the dangerousness of the acts does
169. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 5(b) at 322 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr,
supra note 149, § 6.2(d)(1), at 506.
170. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
171. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 5(b) at 322 (1985); see 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 56 (M. Howe ed. 1963)("[T]he considerations being... the nearness of the danger, the
greatness of the harm, and the degree of apprehension felt.").
172. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 51(b). That this was the import of Justice Holmes' "dangerous probability" language in Swift is made clear by other language in that opinion, citing the
same authority:
Not every act that may be done with intent to produce an unlawful result is unlawful, or
constitutes an attempt. It is a question of proximity and degree. The distinction between
mere preparation and attempt is well known in the criminal law. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 272. The same distinction is recognized in cases like the present.
Swift & Co., 196 U.S. at 402.
173. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 5(b), at 323 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr,
supra note 149, § 6.2(d)(1), at 506; see 0. HOLMES, supra note 171, at 55 ("The reason for punishing any act must generally be to prevent some harm which is foreseen as likely to follow that act
under the circumstances in which it is done.").
174. See supra Part IV.A.
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reflect, to some extent, the dangerousness of the actor. Thus, although the
proximity tests cannot be the basis of attempt liability, they are not entirely
irrelevant. 17 5
2.

The Probable Desistance Approach

The probable desistance test for attempts states that acts constitute an
attempt if it is unlikely that the actor will thereafter voluntarily desist from
efforts to commit the crime. This approach, unlike the proximity approaches, focuses on the actor's dangerous character and is more consistent
with the basic purpose of attempt law. However, without adequate empirical evidence to determine whether a person would voluntarily desist in any
given situation, this test is identical to the proximity tests in its

application. 176
3.

The Equivocality Approach

Under the equivocality test, also known as the res ipsa loquitur test, acts
constitute an attempt only if they unequivocally manifest the actor's intent
to commit a crime. Surrounding circumstances are relevant to this determination, but the actor's representations of intent are irrelevant.1 77 This test
is a procedural device designed to protect against the risks associated with a
defendant's representations of purpose; if the act itself manifests intent to
commit a crime, then there is no risk that an innocent person may be convicted based upon an unreliable confession.17 8 Further, as a substantive
matter, an equivocal act may also represent an equivocal state of mind.
Therefore, by requiring unequivocal acts, the law assures that the actor in175. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 5(b), at 323 (1985). The proximity tests have
also been criticized because they are inconsistent with modem authority's rejection of the impossibility defense. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 149, § 6.2(d)(1), at 506; see infra Part IV.C.5.
In addition, although proximity to the completed crime is relevant to the dangerousness of the
actor and the need for preventive arrest, proximity emphasizes only one aspect of the actor's
conduct and does not answer the crucial question of how close is close enough for an attempt.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 5(a), at 322 (1985).
176. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 5(d) at 324 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTr,
supranote 149, § 6.2(d)(2). Another variation of this test asked whether the normal citizen would
voluntarily desist after committing the acts in question. Of course, making such a determination
is almost impossible for any specific defendant, and raises the problem of unpopular laws that
normal citizens violate. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 5(e) at 325 (1985). In addition,
this approach could greatly expand attempt liability because almost any step in furtherance of a
crime departs from a normal citizen's conduct. Id.
177. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 5(f), at 326 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
supra note 149, § 6.2(d)(3), at 507.
178. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 5(f), at 326-27 (1985).
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deed possesses the intent worthy of punishment for the attempt.179 The
major weakness of the equivocality approach is that it completely ignores
the value of the actor's representations of criminal intent. Likewise,
although equivocal acts alone may not establish intent to commit a crime,
they may, in conjunction with the actor's confessions, establish that
intent. 180
4. The Model Penal Code Approach
The modem approach to criminal attempts is represented in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code." 1 The Model Penal Code approach
states that conduct amounts to an attempt if it "is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in...
commission of the crime." 182 To address the problem of proving criminal
intent, the Model Penal Code states that "[c]onduct shall not be held to
constitute a substantial step ... unless it is strongly corroborative of the
actor's criminal purpose." ' 3
Unlike the proximity tests, the Model Penal Code approach is consistent
with the purposes of attempt law - focusing upon the actor's dangerous
propensity as evidenced by the intent to commit a crime. The Model Penal
Code shifts the emphasis from what remains to be done (the proximity
tests) to what the actor has already done and from the dangerousness of the
18 4
acts (the proximity tests) to the dangerousness of the actor.
Like the equivocality approach, the Model Penal Code is concerned
with the problems of proving criminal purpose and infirmity of purpose.
The Model Penal Code attacks both of these problems by requiring that
conduct be strongly corroborative of criminal purpose before it can constitute an attempt. The Code, however, recognizes the legitimate evidentiary
value of the actor's representations of purpose and ambiguous conduct is
considered in light of these representations. Therefore, if the conduct is
strongly corroborative of that criminal purpose,"8 the Code allows the
factfnder to consider the defendant's representations and otherwise ambig-

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 328-29; W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 149, § 6.2(d)(3), at 508.
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 149, § 6.2(d)(3), at 508.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 at 295-97 (1985).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) at 296 (1985).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) at 296 (1985).

184. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 6(a), at 329 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScOrr,

supra note 149, § 6.2(d)(4), at 508.
185.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 6(a), at 330-31 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,

supra note 149, § 6.2(d)(4), at 508.
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uous conduct to determine whether the defendent possessed the requisite
criminal intent.
5. The Impossibility Defense
Certainly the most perplexing area of attempt law is the defense of impossibility. Under the traditional approach, legal impossibility was a defense, while factual impossibility was not."s6 Distinguishing between legal
and factual impossibility, however, proved to be very difficult in practice.
Therefore, modem authorities, including the Model Penal Code, reject the
defense of impossibility so long as the actor has the requisite intent to commit a crime which is strongly corroborated by conduct in furtherance of
that intent."8 7 Again, the proper focus of attempt law is upon the dangerousness of the actor, not the acts.
Rejection of the impossibility defense does not make impossibility entirely irrelevant. For example, if completion of the substantive offense is
impossible, the actor may lack the requisite intent to commit the substantive offense. If, however, the actor truly intends to commit the crime despite the impossibility of its completion, the actor is nonetheless dangerous
and worthy of punishment. In general, impossibility, like its related proximity tests, is an inappropriate basis to judge the dangerousness of an actor.
If facts unknown to the actor or improper methods are all that prevent the
actor from achieving her intended result, then she may try again, usually
18
with more success.
D.

General CriminalAttempt and Attempt to Monopolize

1. In General
Modem criminal attempt law provides a number of basic principles that
should be applied in attempted monopolization cases. Initially, attempted
monopolization law should focus primarily upon identifying those individuals who have demonstrated dangerous character worthy of punishment. In
this context, dangerous character comes from an intent to achieve monopoly power by using anticompetitive or illegitimately exclusionary conduct.
The conduct involved must be a substantial step in furtherance of and
strongly corroborative of the defendant's intent to achieve monopoly power
186. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 149, § 6.3, at 510.
187. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 3, at 307 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, supra
note 149, § 6.3, at 510.
188.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 3(b) at 315 (1985); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTw,

supra note 149, § 6.3(a)(1).
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by improper means. Probability of actual success should be relevant only to
the extent that it reflects the defendant's true intentions.
The majority approach to attempted monopolization, based on an unthinking and inflexible use of Justice Holmes' Swift language, stands in
stark contrast to that suggested by modem criminal law. Although Justice
Holmes' dangerous probability approach to defining the conduct necessary
for the attempt dominated criminal attempt law at the time of the passage
of the Sherman Act and at the writing of the Swift opinion,' it is now clear
that attempt law in 1905 was in a very early stage of its development - the
basic purposes underlying attempt liability had not yet been articulated. 190
General attempt law has since rejected the dangerous probability approach
to testing conduct as inconsistent with the underlying purposes of attempt
law. Therefore, the courts' rigid adherence to dangerous probability of suc189. The Sherman Act became law in 1890, and Justice Holmes wrote Swift in 1905. Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890); Swift & Co., 196 U.S. 375. An analysis of criminal law authorities
writing near the turn of the century reveals that Justice Holmes' dangerous proximity approach to
defining the attempt was indeed dominant. See I J. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW §§ 739, 759(1), 762(4) (8th ed. 1892); 1 J. BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW
§§ 739, 759(1), 762(4) (9th ed. 1923); W. CLARK, HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW § 55(a)-(b) &
comment, at 105 (1894); id. at § 55(a)-(b) & comment, at 127, 129 (2d ed. 1902); W. CLARK & V.
MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES §§ 123-124 (2d ed. 1905); J. MAY, THE LAW
OF CRIMES § 183 (2d ed. 1893); id. at § 183 (3d ed. 1905); 1 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON
CRIMINAL LAW § 181 (8th ed. 1880); 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 220 (12th
ed. 1932).
190. Even at this early date, tensions were evident in attempt doctrine, primarily in discussions of the inapplicability of the impossibility defense in certain circumstances. These discussions
suggested that proximity to the completed offense was not the touchstone of attempt liability. See
1 J. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW §§ 742, 749-50, 752-54 (8th ed.
1892); 1 J. BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 742, 749-50,752-54 (9th ed. 1923); W. CLARK,
HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 106-11 (1894); id. at 130-36 (2d ed. 1902); W. CLARK & W.
MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES §§ 127-29 (2d ed. 1905); J. MAY, THE LAW
OF CRIMES § 184 (2d ed. 1893); id. § 184 (3d ed. 1905); 1 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 182-86 (8th ed. 1880); 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §§ 221-25
(12th ed. 1932). Further, hints of other approaches to distinguishing between preparation and the
attempt were emerging. See I J. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 740
(8th ed. 1892) ("A Wider View - is the following ... the public suffers from a mere alarm of
crime."); I J. BISHOP, BISHOP ON CRIMINAL LAW § 740 (9th ed. 1923); W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 123, at 181 (2d ed. 1905) ("There is also a
distinction, though it is not so very clearly defined, between preparation and attempt." (emphasis
added)). Traces of the equivocality test were evident in the following statement:
[A]s might be expected, courts which agree upon the principle are not entirely consistent in
its application. The dividing line between acts preparatory to and in execution of a crime is
very shadowy. If the act preparatory be unequivocal and explicable only upon the theory
that it was intended as a step in the commission of a crime,... it seems to be held to be an
attempt; although, if explicable as a lawful act, it might be otherwise.
J. MAY, THE LAW OF CRIMES § 183, at 161-62 (2d ed. 1893) (footnote omitted); id. § 183, at 16566 (3d ed. 1905).
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cess as an element of attempted monopolization has frozen development of
the offense in a primitive and crude form.19
Because of the Sherman Act's lack of detail and specificity, the Supreme
Court has not generally interpreted it "as if it were primarily a criminal
statute."' 9 2 In the context of attempted monopolization, however, the
Court has so interpreted the statute; Justice Holmes drew directly from the
criminal law in his Swift opinion.' 93 In other antitrust contexts, departure
from criminal law principles is justified by the need to expand civil antitrust
liability beyond the strict confines of criminal law.19 4 In the context of attempted monopolization, however, departure from modern criminal law by
requiring dangerous probability of success actually restricts the scope of
attempted monopolization.19 5
Without a reasoned analysis, there is no reason to depart from the general criminal law of attempt in the context of attempted monopolization. In
fact, courts have rarely even noticed that attempted monopolization departs
from its criminal law roots, let alone attempted to justify the departure.1 96
191. One could argue that Congress intended to adopt the criminal law of attempts as it
existed in 1890, and therefore, dangerous probability of success must remain an element of attempted monopolization. Cf. American Airlines, 743 F.2d at 1120-21 (defendant argues that solicitation cannot be an attempt to monopolize because solicitation could not constitute an attempt at
common law in 1890). One answer to this argument is that even though the proximity approach
was the dominant approach to defining attempts in 1890, the law was still in a state of evolution,
and other approaches existed. See supra note 190. Congress could have, but did not, explicitly
adopt one particular approach to attempted monopolization. Rather, Congress delegated the job
of defining, developing, and refining the contours of attempted monopolization to the courts in
accordance with general common law principles of attempt, just as the state legislatures had done
for most attempt crimes. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. This view also is consistent
with the often repeated notion that the Sherman Act is a general "charter of freedom," written in
very broad terms, much like the Constitution, to allow the courts to develop a common law of
antitrust. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933); Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,4 (1958) ("tt]he Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty"); see generally 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, $
310. In fashioning the level of intent necessary to invoke the Sherman Act's criminal sanctions,
the Supreme Court relied heavily upon modern criminal law, as reflected in the Model Penal
Code. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 443-46 (1978).
192. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 439.
193. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text. Note also that in terms of its level of
detail and specificity, the Sherman Act's attempted monopolization provision is similar to most
criminal attempt statutes. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
194. See United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 438-39.
195. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 6(a), at 329 (1985).

196. One court noted the differences between dangerous probability of success and the modem substantial step approach to defining conduct required for the attempt. That court, however,
failed to inquire further or justify attempted monopolization's deviation from the general criminal
law of attempts beyond noting that precedent within the circuit required a dangerous probability
of success. American Airlines, 743 F.2d at 1119; see also International Distribution Centers, Inc.
v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 791 (2d Cir. 1987) (accepting the argument that dangerous
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The remainder of this section analyzes the unique context of attempted monopolization and how the general principles of criminal attempts should
apply in this context.
2.

Applying Criminal Attempt Principles to Attempted Monopolization

Specific intent to commit a crime is the essence of the crime of attempt.
For several reasons, however, ascertaining specific intent to monopolize is
especially tricky. First, intent to gain market share and prevail over competitors is the goal of all competitive behavior - legitimate intent from
illegitimate. Therefore, it is difficult to discern legitimate and illegitimate

intent.' 97 Second, antitrust law often deals with business organizations, as
opposed to individuals. Therefore, the intent of the business firm is an
amalgamation of the intentions of many people acting on behalf of the organization. 198 Lastly, specific intent evidence may be misleading because of
the general tendency of businesspeople to overdramatize their competitive
dexterity, often describing their actions in a coercive and predatory manner.
Thus, too heavy a reliance on direct evidence of specific intent will inure to
the benefit of more sophisticated businesses which know better than to leave
a trail of such evidence. 199
As in all attempt crimes,2 "° however, the trier of fact frequently infers
specific intent to monopolize from the anticompetitive conduct that satisfies
probability of success should be an element of attempted monopolization by analogy to criminal
law of attempts based upon § 2 precedent), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987); cf. 3 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 2,
822b, 831 (noting that the classic formulation of criminal attempt
required proximity to success, and that the modem purpose of criminal attempt is punishment,
but failing to recognize the inconsistency).
197. Inglis, 668 F.2d 1014; Oetiker, 556 F.2d at 8; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.2, at
161; see 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 729.5d, at 606 (P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp
Supp. 1988) (submitting specific intent to the jury is dangerous because the relevant intent is
seldom precisely defined).
198. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.2, at 161. Note that vicarious criminal liability for
corporations based upon the acts of employees acting in the corporation's behalf and within the
scope of employment is generally accepted by the courts. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, supranote 149, § 3.10. The mental state of the employee can be attributed to the corporation so long as the employee is acting in a managerial or policy-making capacity. Id. § 3.10(c), at
260-63. For a case applying these principles in the context of attempted monopolization, see
United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 300-01 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1122 (1977).
199. Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1028 & n.6 (quoting R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW - AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 189-90 (1976)); H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.2, at 162. Similar problems with
specific intent in all criminal attempts are the reason for the equivocality approach to attempt
conduct, and the Model Penal Code's requirement that attempt conduct strongly corroborate the
actor's criminal purpose. See supra Part IV.C.3 & IV.C.4.
200. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 comment 2, at 306 (1985).
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the conduct element of attempted monopolization. 20 1 This approach is especially appropriate in attempted monopolization cases, given the problems
with direct evidence of specific intent. It is also appropriate because specific
intent to monopolize encompasses not only intent to achieve monopoly
power, but also the use of anticompetitive conduct."0 2 Thus, the conduct
element of attempted monopolization itself supports an inference of intent
to use anticompetitive means.
Since intent to use anticompetitive means can be supplied by attempted
monopolization's requisite conduct, the only remaining element in the attempt is intent to achieve monopoly power. Whether courts should infer
the intent from conduct should depend on the type of conduct at issue.
Some types of conduct, standing alone, unambiguously evidence an intent
to achieve monopoly power. Using the terminology of the Model Penal
Code, such conduct strongly corroborates an intent to achieve monopoly
power without any inquiry into market evidence.2 0 3
Other types of conduct are more ambiguous - they may or may not be
used to attain monopoly power. With respect to such conduct, the best
evidence of intent to achieve monopoly power often is the defendant's actual ability to achieve monopoly power through that course of conduct.
Usually the defendant may achieve monopoly power through the use of
such conduct only by already possessing some degree of market power.
Thus, the market share and other evidence the courts have required to show
dangerous probability of success in attempted monopolization 2" is not totally irrelevant. However, as in all criminal attempts, 20 ability to succeed
is most relevant in assessing whether the defendant indeed possesses intent
to commit the crime.20 6 Using the terminology of the Model Penal Code,
201. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

203. See supra Part IV.C.4.
204. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Parts IV.C.1 & IV.C.5.
206. Many courts (primarily in the Ninth Circuit) and commentators recognize the value of
market share and other market power evidence in attributing an intent to achieve monopoly
power to ambiguous conduct. See, e.g., M.A.P. Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1303, 1308 (9th
Cir. 1982); Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1029; CaliforniaSteel, 650 F.2d at 1004; Hunt-Wesson Foods, 627
F.2d at 925-26; Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610 F.2d 665, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1980);
Oetiker, 556 F.2d at 8; 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2,

833d, at 341; H.

supra note 2, § 6.2, at 163-64, § 6.3, at 164, § 6.4, at 166; L. SULLIVAN, supra note
3, §§ 51(a), 52.
Of course, inability to succeed or ultimate failure does not doom the attempt claim, because
failure is the only thing that prevents the attempt claim from being a monopolization claim. If
ambiguous conduct, in light of market power at the time of the challenged conduct, strongly
HOVENKAMP,

corroborates the defendant's intent to achieve monopoly power through the use of anticompetitive

conduct, then a finding of an attempt is permissible. See, e.g., Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore &
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ambiguous conduct does not strongly corroborate the defendant's intent to
achieve monopoly power unless the defendant already possesses some de20 7
gree of market power.

Like specific intent to monopolize, it may be difficult to distinguish between illegitimate or anticompetitive conduct and conduct which is true
competition on the merits.2 "8 Although some conduct, standing alone, is
anticompetitive and illegitimate, most is ambiguous and, thus, may require
market share and other evidence to determine its competitive impact.20 9
Under the Model Penal Code such conduct does not strongly corroborate
the defendant's intent to use anticompetitive conduct to achieve monopoly
power without evidence of market power.
In sum, the modem criminal law of attempt counsels that although dangerous probability of success should not be an element of the offense, the
evidence courts use to establish dangerous probability often may be relevant
when the defendant's conduct is ambiguous, to clarify or corroborate either:
(1) the defendant's intent to achieve monopoly power, or (2) the competiCo., 709 F.2d 980, 991-92 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding jury's finding of attempted monopolization
despite the fact that the defendant's market share fell from 100% to 38% over period encompassing the challenged conduct), cert. denied,465 U.S. 1100 (1984); cf. sources cited supra note 47; see
also American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114 (attempt impossible only because solicited competitor rejected proposal to fix prices) (discussed supra note 166). As the Lessig court aptly put it:
Of ourse,... a probability [of actual monopolization] may be relevant circumstantial
evidence of intent, but the specific intent itself is the only evidence of dangerous probability
the statute requires-perhaps on the not unreasonable assumption that the actor is better
able than others to judge the practical possibility of achieving his illegal objective.
Lessig, 327 F.2d at 474 (footnote omitted).
207. See supra Part IV.C.4.
208. See General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 804 (8th Cir. 1987)
("Anticompetitive conduct is conduct without legitimate business purpose that makes sense only
because it eliminates competition."); Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986); Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1028, 1030-31; Blair Foods, 610
F.2d at 670; Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1354-56 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Oetiker v. Werke, 556 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The
Neumann court offered the following definition of anticompetitive conduct in the context of attempted monopolization:
[P]redation involves aggression against business rivals through the use of business practices
that would not be considered profit maximizing except for the expectation that (1) actual
rivals will be driven from the market, or the entry of potential rivals blocked or delayed, so
that the predator will gain or retain a market share sufficient to command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the predator
finds threatening to its realization of monopoly profits.
Neumann, 786 F.2d at 427.
209. Courts and commentators have recognized the value of market evidence in determining
whether ambiguous conduct is indeed anticompetitive. See, eg., Oetiker, 556 F.2d at 8; 3 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 833d, at 341; H. HOVENKAMP, supranote 2, § 6.3, at 164,
§ 6.4, at 166-67; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 51(a), at 135-36, § 52, at 139.
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tive effects of the challenged conduct. 2 10 However, with respect to unambiguous conduct illegitimate conduct facially evidencing an intent to
achieve monopoly power 21 1 - courts should not require market share evidence. Proof of the conduct alone should be sufficient to establish attempted monopolization.2 12
Direct evidence of specific intent to monopolize, though often troublesome, 21 3 should retain some vitality in attempted monopolization. Just as
the Model Penal Code rejected the equivocality approach to attempt conduct, which unduly discounts the actor's representations of purpose,"' a attempted monopolization jurisprudence also should recognize the legitimate
use of such evidence when sufficiently corroborated by other evidence. For
example, although evidence of certain types of unambiguously anticompetitive conduct alone should allow the plaintiff's case to reach a jury without
added evidence of market power, direct evidence of the defendant's purpose
may help in characterizing the conduct as indeed falling within one of these
categories of conduct. Further, in cases of ambiguous conduct which require evidence of market power to either corroborate intent to achieve monopoly power or to determine competitive effects, direct evidence of specific
intent may clarify the defendant's intent to achieve monopoly power
through anticompetitive conduct.2 1 5
The framework outlined above is somewhat similar to the Ninth Circuit's approach to attempted monopolization.21 6 Despite that court's unfortunate adherence to the dangerous probability of success language, it
groups attempted monopolization conduct into two basic categories: (1)
unambiguous conduct evidencing on its face specific intent to achieve monopoly power through predatory means, and (2) ambiguous conduct requir210. These types of conduct will be discussed infra Part VI.B. Even though market evidence

is justifiably required in these cases, it need not be as extensive or refined as the evidence required
to establish monopoly power. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 835b, at 348; H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.5, at 168; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 52, at 140.

211.
ent, and
212.
213.
214.

For example, per se § 1 violations, predatory pricing, fraudulent procurement of a patsham litigation.
These types of conduct will be discussed in detail infra Part VI.A.
See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.C.3 & IV.CA.

215. Courts and commentators have recognized the value of direct evidence of specific intent

in characterizing ambiguous conduct and clarifying intent to achieve monopoly power. See Inglis,
668 F.2d at 1030-31; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.2, at 163-64; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3,
§ 51(a), at 136-37. Even Professors Areeda and Turner, who generally reject any role for intent in
attempted monopolization cases, acknowledge that direct evidence of specific intent should be
allowed to help characterize the purpose and effects of ambiguous conduct. 3 P. AREEDA & D.

TURNER, supra note 2,

822b, 823-24.

216. See supra Parts II.B.3 & II.B.4.
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ing additional evidence of either specific intent or market power. The
approach proposed here materially differs only in that it would always require some market evidence in cases of ambiguous conduct. Given the misleading nature of direct evidence and the strong corroborative value of
market evidence in cases of ambiguous conduct, the Ninth Circuit approach
places too much reliance on direct evidence of specific intent.
V.

A.

DANGEROUS PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS AND ANTITRUST POLICY

DangerousProbabilityof Success and Its Focus on Market Share A Gap in Sherman Act Enforcement

As previously demonstrated, the dangerous probability of success requirement in attempted monopolization is misguided both in terms of
Supreme Court precedent and the offense's criminal roots. Perhaps more
importantly, however, its presence prevents the attempt offense from being
a truly effective tool for enforcement of antitrust policy. By focusing almost
exclusively on market share rather than the defendant's conduct, the dangerous probability requirement creates a huge gap in Sherman Act enforcement. Specifically, Section 1 of the Sherman Act is directed at concerted
activity, while Section 2 is directed primarily at unilateral activity.
Although per se Section 1 violations are condemned without any analysis of
their effects on competition or relevant markets, the dangerous probability
requirement allows scrutiny of single-firm anticompetitive conduct only if
the defendant possesses market power dangerously close to monopoly. Because the attempt offense is limited by the dangerous probability requirement, and the monopolization offense reaches only those defendants who
actually have attained monopoly power, a large gap exists in Sherman Act
enforcement. Single-firm conduct is immune from antitrust scrutiny as long
2 17
as the defendant does not possess market power approaching monopoly.
In attempted monopolization cases, the defendant's conduct, rather
than its market share, should be the center of attention. As Professor Sullivan has noted: "Though we say we infer the intent from the conduct we are
saying more fully, more accurately, that the conduct, though not resulting
in full-blown monopoly, is a sufficient threat to competition to warrant in-

217. Many others have noted the gap that the requirement of dangerous probability of success in attempts to monopolize leaves in the Sherman Act. See, eg., Greyhound Computer Corp.
v. International Business Mach. Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 504-05 & n.37 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1040 (1978); Oetiker v. Werke, 556 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 3 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 2,

833a; DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 24, at 141-42.
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tervention."21 8 The dangerous probability requirement, with its narrow focus on market share, virtually eliminates the defendant's conduct as an
issue in attempt cases. This approach is, of course, utterly insensitive to the
varying competitive consequences of differing types of conduct.
Scholars agree that anticompetitive conduct varies widely in its ability
to give the actor market power.219 For example, Professors Areeda and
Turner note that, in theory, conduct should be judged by a sliding scale of
market power - the more insidious the conduct, the less market power
needed to achieve monopoly through that conduct.2 2 ° Although this approach is impossible to apply in practice with any precision,2 21 it does suggest that courts need to be sensitive to the varying effects of different types
of conduct.
Under the dangerous probability of success requirement, all conduct,
from blatantly predatory to "honestly industrial," is treated alike. It is ignored. Rather, the court inflexibly focuses on the threshold question of
whether the defendant possesses a certain minimum market share.22 2
The gap created in antitrust enforcement by the majority approach is
anomalous in light of indications in the legislative history of the Sherman
Act that Section 2 was intended to prohibit the same sorts of conduct under
both Sections 1 and 2, with Section 1 reaching concerted activity and Section 2 reaching unilateral activity.2 23 Early Supreme Court decisions also
218. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 52, at 139. Although they use dubious reasoning, see
supra notes 154, 160, Professors Areeda and Turner agree that conduct should be the primary
focus of the attempted monopolization offense. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2,
822b.
219. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.5, at 169; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 52, at
139.
220. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 834b.
221. Professors Areeda and Turner agree. Id.
222. For cases citing market shares in other cases, without comparing the types of conduct at
issue, in order to conclude that the defendant possessed no dangerous probability of success, see
International Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 793 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 826
(6th Cir. 1982); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 921 (1982). Other courts have warned of the dangers of the search for a threshold
market share for attempt liability. See Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d
480, 490-91 (5th Cir. 1984) (warned of dangers, but nonetheless searched without regard to different types of conduct at issue); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,
668 F.2d 1014, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Cliff Food Stores, Inc.
v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969).
223. Greyhound Computer Corp., 559 F.2d at 504-05 & n.37; Cooper, supra note 3, at 424432; Note, supranote 3, at 1452-59; Note, Prosecutionsfor Attempts to Monopolize: The Relevance
of the Relevant Market, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 110, 115-16 (1967); Note, Attempts to Monopolize:
The Offense Redefined, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 704, 709, 711.
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seemed to interpret the act in this fashion. In Standard Oil Co. v. United
States,2 24 for example, the Court stated:
[H]aving by the first section forbidden all means of monopolizing
trade, that is, unduly restraining it by means of every contract, combination, etc., the 2d [sec] seeks, ifpossible, to make the prohibitions
of the act all the more complete andperfect by embracingall attempts
to reach the end prohibited by the first section, that is, restraintsof
trade, by any attempt to monopolize, or monopolization thereof,
even although the acts by which such results are attempted to be
brought about or are brought about be not embraced within the general enumeration of the first section.2 25
Certainly, by immunizing a whole class of anticompetitive conduct from
antitrust scrutiny, the dangerous probability requirement is not designed to
'226
make the Sherman Act prohibitions "all the more complete and perfect.
In stark contrast, the dangerous probability requirement is functionally
designed to immunize conduct with which the attempt offense should be
most concerned - that which strongly corroborates an intent to achieve
monopoly power through blatantly predatory acts, without the need for any
significant degree of market power.2 27 The structure of a market does not
remain fixed for all time. A market that is highly competitive with easy
entry today gradually may become more oligopolistic over time. The strategic actions of firms competing within the market often can direct changes
in the market, and existing firms want to make the market less competitive
giving them higher profits. 228 The gap the courts have created in the Sherman Act allows them to do just that. For example, a major barrier to entry
into any market is the degree of competitive reaction or retaliation that
prospective entrants can expect.22 9 Thus, the more numerous and harmful
the predatory and exclusionary practices that the courts allow in a market
under the guise of "no dangerous probability of successful" monopolization, the less competitive and more concentrated that market will actually
become. The attempt offense should identify and punish those firms which
224. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
225. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
226. Id.
227. Professor Hovenkamp uses the example of sabotage. "A firm that seeks to create a
monopoly by dynamiting its competitor's plants does not need market power - only a saboteur
and a match." H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.5, at 169.
228. A substantial body of literature on business strategy is devoted to analysis of the competitive structure of markets, their evolution over time, and how firms can anticipate and influence
these changes so as to maximize profits for firms competing in the market by, inter alia, creating
barriers to entry and reducing rivalry. See generally M. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY:
TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS chs. 1, 8 (1980).
229. Id. at 14.
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are bent on attaining power by any means, fair or foul, before markets develop to a point where such firms actually stand a chance of succeeding in
their quests.
B. DangerousProbabilityof Success and Antitrust Ideology
The controversy surrounding whether dangerous probability of success
should be an element of an attempt to monopolize provides yet another
battlefield in the ongoing policy debate in antitrust law between the traditional and the "Chicago" schools of antitrust ideology. Traditional antitrust commentators believe that antitrust should be concerned with
noneconomic or distributive goals including, for example,
a preference for decentralization of economic power, reduction of
the range within which private discretion may be exercised in matters materially affecting the welfare of others, enhancement of the
opportunity for more people to exercise independently entrepreneurial impulses, and, most blantantly [sic], a social preference
for the small rather than the large .... 230
The currently ascendant Chicago School rejects such populist sentiments, asserting instead that allocative efficiency should be the only goal of
antitrust law. 231 This approach is grounded on:
a basic belief that the free private market will usually automatically
promote consumer welfare by determining the most efficient market
structure. Thus, in the absence of government intervention that
erects some barriers or other direct or indirect controls, they believe
that resources will be allocated efficiently, that the most efficient
firms will survive and produce the goods consumers desire most at
the most reasonable prices.2 32
Inherent in this approach, of course, is the belief that if a practice is
efficient,
it should be legal, even if it injures small businesses, makes big businesses even bigger, and makes it more difficult for newcomers to
enter a particular field. [The "efficiency only" advocate] will not
attempt to balance these "competing" concerns against economic ef-

230. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 2, at 11. Blake & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 377-400, 422-66 (1965). See also Pitofsky, The Political
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979).

231. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979).
232.

OPPENHEIM, WESTON & MCCARTHY, CASES AND COMMENTS ON FEDERAL ANTI-

TRUST LAWS 10 n.13 (4th ed. 1981).

1990]

MONOPOLIZATION AND THE SHERMAN ACT

ficiency, because she does not see them as competing. They are simply ignored.2 33
The ideological struggle between the traditional and Chicago Schools is
brought into sharp focus in the attempt to monopolize context, as highlighted by a 1979 debate involving Professor Robert Bork, the Chicago
School's premier spokesman, plaintiffs' antitrust attorney Maxwell M.
Blecher, and John H. Shenefield, Associate Attorney General of the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division. Mr. Blecher initially notes the pro-defendant bias of current attempt law and its inconsistency with traditional
antitrust policy:
What we sense out of the courts of appeal is a growing bent to
protect the establishment, to protect the dominant and established
firms.
The effect of that bent is not procompetitive,... but, from my
viewpoint, it is anticompetitive.... I ask you out there who, in his
right mind, what small company, soundly managed but requiring
external financing, is going to venture into competition with the established giants under the present state of the law? If the principals
of such a small company came to me, I would tell them they were
crazy, because if the established giant reduces its price or engages in
other anticompetitive activities, they are going to be left without any
recourse whatever. In short, I think we have now a state of the law
which is anticompetitive in terms of soliciting new entrants to take
on established, market-dominating giants.
Moreover, the present law, in my view, is inconsistent with the
political and social foundations which admittedly underlie Sherman
Act philosophy. Those foundations include solicitude for the
smaller businessmen of this nation, for the easy prey. They include
the goal of maintaining competitors for the sake of competition and,
I think, for the sake of a society in which power is dispersed
throughout the populace. If, through our deference to economic
analyses of efficiency, we allow each of our industries to be progressively overtaken by a monolith, then we not only lose the competitors who provide competition and place ourselves at the monopoly
pricing power of the remaining giants; we assume the social and
political risks attendant on the concentration of vast economic
power in a very limited number of private hands.
PROFESSOR BORK: I think it is worthwhile making explicit,
the way Max Blecher has, the rationale for the antitrust laws. His is
not the conventional rationale. The rule that says, "If you are pric233. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 2.1.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:355

ing at or above marginal cost, you are safe," is a rule designed to
maximize the economic welfare of consumers. A rule that says,
"You can price above marginal cost and still be guilty if you hurt a
smaller firm," is not maximizing consumer welfare; it is maximizing
the number of small firms in the market.
That is a totally different social policy than competition. It reminds me of the rule that the Democratic Party operated under for a
while in their primaries: We are going to have primaries with free,
open, hard-fought contests, except you have to elect so many delegates who are women, so many who are minorities, and so many
who are young people. So it is a free, open, democratic process, but
it has to arrive at this preordained result.
That is what we are being given here, a free, open, competitive
process, except that nobody can get hurt in it and it has to arrive at a
result in which small, inefficient firms survive, no matter what.
That is not antitrust policy.
MR. SHENEFIELD: I would like to take substantial difference
with you on that point. My sense of it is that this is really the fundamental error of your book [THE ANTITRUST PARADOX] PROFESSOR BORK: So many have been identified now.
MR. SHENEFIELD: Which is that it is the same thing to say
that there will be one winner - that the competitive process works
itself out and however it comes out is the best for consumer welfare.
My own notion is that it is not necessarily true to say whatever is, is
right. I want to preserve the competitive process, and to accomplish
this you have to look at the long run, not the short run. In the long
run, I want to keep as many competitors in the marketplace as possible so that competition will have a chance to work. It will never
have a chance to work if there is only one firm left in the
marketplace.2 34
The tone and effect of Professor Bork's comments are instructive. He
laments the "preordained result" dictated by traditional antitrust policy.
Yet, perhaps the only thing preordained about the traditional approach is a
concern with keeping enough competitors in the market to provide alternatives to consumers, to keep prices at competitive levels, to temper anticompetitive behavior of dominant firms, and ultimately to prevent outright
monopolization. Nothing in traditional doctrine dictates who the survivors
will be, inhibits any form of legitimate competitive behavior, or artificially
prevents inefficient or poorly managed firms from being driven from the
market. In stark contrast to the traditional approach is the "antitrust" the234. Debate, supra note 3, at 1442-43, 1446-47.
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ory of the Chicago School, which in its various forms is functionally
designed to achieve a truly "preordained result" - the defendant's victory,
"no matter what." The majority approach to attempted monopolization is
a legal nonstandard, assuring that no defendant's conduct, however onerous, will be scrutinized unless and until that defendant's market share approaches actual monopoly. In the meantime, injured or destroyed
competitors are banished from the courthouse on a threshold issue. The
real issue, whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct has damaged
the competitive process, and whether that conduct ought to be proscribed,
is not considered. The trier of fact never undertakes (because it is unnecessary to disposition of the case) any searching analysis of what the defendant
did, and why the plaintiff is objecting. That is, under the majority approach, the facts of the case, as opposed to the structure of the industry or
market in which those facts occurred, are irrelevant.
C. DangerousProbabilityof Success -

Abrogation of the Jury Function

The policy debate discussed above highlights and is wholly consistent
with a disturbing tendency, often fueled by Chicago School ideology, that
has evolved and become entrenched in Sherman Act cases generally. Simply stated, the law is preoccupied with doctrines, the sole effect of which is
to banish plaintiffs from the courthouse on threshold issues with no consideration of the effect of the defendant's conduct on the competitive process.
That is, defendants not only escape liability (often on a motion for summary
judgment or to dismiss), they also escape any scrutiny of their conduct. For
example, the state action doctrine, 35 based on a shaky federalism rationale,236 insulates from antitrust scrutiny or liability anticompetitive activities
of state governments and actions taken by private individuals at the direction of and under supervision of the state. The Noerr-Pennington doc235. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
236. In Parker,the entire Sherman Act discussion occupies less than three pages in the U.S.
Reports. Id. at 350-52. No authority is cited for the proposition that the Sherman Act should not
apply to state action or official action directed by the state, except that the Act doesn't mention it
and the Act's legislative history indicates that it was aimed at "business combinations." Id. at
351. The focus of the legislative history on business combinations is, of course, not surprising
given the well-documented fact that public outrage toward the conduct of the trusts was the
primary motivation for passage of the Act. For example, one commentator has noted:
By the late 1880's, the accumulation and use of vast economic power by these [trusts and
monopolies] had caused great public hostility, evidenced by a popular, generalized hatred
of trusts and commercial monopolies.... The Sherman Act debates contain numerous
references to this public resentment, which was one of the prime causal factors behind the
legislation.
1 E. KINTNER, THE LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY OF THE FEDERAL ANTrRusT LAWS AND RELATED

STATUTES 11 (1978). One of the participants in that debate, Senator Vest, stated "there will be no
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trine,2 37 arguably required to protect the constitutional right to petition the
government, insulates from antitrust scrutiny individual or concerted efforts to influence the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of government to take action to harm a competitor. As noted by the court in
Pennington: "Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the
antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself
violative of the Sherman Act. '2 38 The Copperweld case239 holds that a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary areperse incapable of conspiring with one another for purposes of establishing Section 1 of the
Sherman Act's threshold requirement of "contract, combination ... or conspiracy." Similar, in effect, is the Supreme Court's triumvirate of GTE
Sylvania,24° Monsanto,241 and Business Electronics.4 2 Collectively, these
decisions mischaracterize horizontal conduct as vertical and concerted conduct as unilateral, and make it virtually impossible for the plaintiff to survive a summary judgment motion in the most common modern antitrust
fact situation: termination by a common supplier of a price-cutting wholesale or retail dealer at the request of competing full-price dealers.
The policy rationales for the various recovery-limiting doctrines vary
widely. They usually parlay a basically unobjectionable (citizens should
controversy... as to the enormity of the abuses that have grown up under the system of trusts
and combinations which now prevail in every portion of the union." 21 CONG. REc. 2463 (1890).
Although the Court in Parkernotes that "a state does not give immunity to those who violate
the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring their action lawful," such is
precisely the effect of the doctrine. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351. The Court does not articulate why
the strong federal policy of promoting competition and preventing monopoly embodied in the
Sherman Act must, in virtually all cases, give way to state policy embodied in anticompetitive
legislation which was often transparently enacted at the request of and for the sole benefit of
entrenched private business.
Despite the virtually nonexistent authority on which the state action doctrine rests, later cases
have uncritically accepted it, and an unwieldy body of case law has arisen concerning when anticompetitive conduct undertaken by private individuals should be deemed state action and thus
immune from antitrust law. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988). The net effect of the state action doctrine, like the
dangerous probability requirement, is to ignore what the defendant did and focus instead on arcane threshold issue, the sole effect of which is to insulate the defendant from any scrutiny of,
much less liability for, its actions.
237. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
238. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
239. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
240. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
241. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
242. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
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have the right to communicate with legislators to urge passage of laws), or
controversial (vertical trade restraints may promote interbrandcompetition
despite their obvious impairment or destruction of intraband competition)2 43 general proposition into a blanket immunity of any scrutiny of the
defendant's specific conduct in any case in which the doctrine arguably
applies.

244

243. GTE Sylvania Inc., stands for the proposition that nonprice vertical restraints (vertical
market division schemes) are to be judged by the rule of reason, rather than by the rule of per se
illegality long applied to vertical price restraints (resale price maintenance). Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). The sole basis of the GTE Sylvania Inc,
holding is that although nonprice vertical restraints always restrict or eliminate intrabrand competition, they may be justified by offsetting benefits to interbrand competition. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. at 51-57. The proposition that vertical restraints promote interbrand competition is
highly controversial, and is in any event unprovable in the context of any litigated case. Even if
true, the argument should be considered irrelevant. In every other antitrust context, the Court
has categorically rejected the argument that an anticompetitive practice can be justified on the
basis that it may promote competition in some other market. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405
U.S. 596, 610 (1972) (horizontal market division); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l. Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (horizontal merger); see Roszkowski, The Sad Legacy of GTE Sylvania and
Its "Rule of Reason": The Dealer Termination Cases and the Demise of § 1 of the Sherman Act,
22 CONN. L. REv. 129 (1990).
244. The Copperweld doctrine fully illustrates this point. Copperweld held that a corporation
and its wholly-owned subsidiary must be viewed as a single enterprise with "complete unity of
interest." Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. Thus, they are incapable of conspiring with one another
for purposes of establishing a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. In discarding the so-called
"intra-enterprise conspiracy" doctrine, the Court abruptly overruled at least seven prior Supreme
Court opinions, id. at 779-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and ignored the fact that corporations are
treated as separate entities for virtually every other purpose in law. The Court justified its approach as follows:
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine looks to the form of an enterprise's structure
and ignores the reality. Antitrust liability should not depend on whether a corporate
subunit is organized as an unincorporated division or a wholly owned subsidiary. A corporation has complete power to maintain a wholly owned subsidiary in either form. The
economic, legal, or other considerations that lead corporate management to choose one
structure over the other are not relevant to whether the enterprise's conduct seriously
threatens competition. Rather, a corporation may adopt the subsidiary form of organization for valid management and related purposes. Separate incorporation may improve
management, avoid special tax problems arising from multi-state operations, or serve other
legitimate interests. Especially in view of the increasing complexity of corporate operations, a business enterprise should be free to structure itself in ways that serve efficiency of
control, economy of operations, and other factors dictated by business judgment without
increasing its exposure to antitrust liability.
If antitrust liability turned on the garb in which a corporate subunit was clothed, parent corporations would be encouraged to convert subsidiaries into unincorporated divisions.... Such an incentive serves no valid antitrust goals but merely deprives consumers
and producers of the benefits that the subsidiary form may yield.
Id. at 772-74. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority's blanket per se rule failed to
recognize the distinction between restraints imposed as a consequence of integrating affiliated corporations and restraints imposed by those corporations on third parties. Such a rule "leaves a
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A major consequence of the dangerous probability requirement and the
other threshold recovery-limiting devices is that the courts have usurped
the fact finding function traditionally reserved to the jury, and have in the
process denied access to the court systems to plaintiffs with legitimate or
even arguably legitimate claims. In Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,24 the Third Circuit announced the restrictive standard governing
proof of Section 1 Sherman Act conspiracy in dealer termination cases later
adopted by the Supreme Court.2 4 6 In dissent, Judge Sloviter eloquently
concluded:

significant gap in the enforcement of § 1 with respect to anticompetitive conduct that is entirely
unrelated to the efficiencies associated with integration." Id. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In the context of the facts of Copperweld, essentially a classic group boycott, Justice Stevens
notes:

There was evidence suggesting that Regal and Copperweld were not integrated, and that
the challenged agreement had little to do with achieving procompetitive efficiencies and
much to do with protecting Regal's market position. The Court does not even try to explain why their common ownership meant that Copperweld and Regal were merely obtaining benefits associated with the efficiencies of integration. Both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals thought that their agreement had a very different result - that it
raised barriers to entry and imposed an appreciable marketwide restraint. The Court's
discussion of the justifications for corporate affiliation is therefore entirely abstract while it dutifully lists the procompetitive justifications for corporate affiliation ....it fails
to explain how any of them relate to the conduct at issue in this case. What is challenged
here is not the fact of integration between Regal and Copperweld, but their specific agreement with respect to Independence. That agreement concerned the exclusion of Independence from the market, and not any efficiency resulting from integration. The facts of this
very case belie the conclusion that affiliated corporations are incapable of engaging in the
kind of conduct that threatens marketwide competition. The Court does not even attempt
to assess the competitive significance of the conduct under challenge here - it never tests
its economic assumptions against the concrete facts before it. Use of economic theory
without reference to the competitive impact of the particular economic arrangement at
issue is properly criticized when it produces overly broad per se rules of antitrust liability;
criticism is no less warranted when a per se rule of antitrust immunity is adopted in the
same way.
In sum, the question that the Court should ask is not why a wholly owned subsidiary
should be treated differently from a corporate division, since the immunity accorded that
type of arrangement is a necessary consequence of Colgate. Rather the question should be
why two corporations that engage in a predatory course of conduct which produces a
marketwide restraint on competition and which, as separate legal entities, can be easily fit
within the language of § 1, should be immunized from liability because they are controlled
by the same godfather. That is a question the Court simply fails to confront.
Id. at 795-96 (footnotes omitted). Essentially, the Copperweld doctrine banishes the plaintiff from
the courthouse on a threshold issue justified by considerations not at issue in the case. The doctrine also prevents any inquiry into the anticompetitive consequences of the defendant's conduct
that precipitated the lawsuit.
245. 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980).
246. Id. at 111 (adopted in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Svc. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764
(1984)).
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Certain statutes, such as those designed to produce equality or
opportunity to minorities, women, retarded persons, on one hand,
and those designed to insure an open economic system for all firms
in the market, on the other hand, stem from conscious congressional
policy judgments about the way in which our society should be ordered. Courts can, but should not, frustrate those public policy
judgments by engaging in judicial interposition through the imposition of technical obstacles to achievement of the legislatively mandated goals.
The need to show that defendants' actions were part of a combination or conspiracy which falls within [Section] 1 of the Sherman
Act must be approached realistically, with an understanding of the
various threads from which the fabric of business decisions are woven. If we are unwilling to allow the jury, which brings the community's experience to the fact finding process, to exercise its own
judgment in making the reasonable inferences from the evidence, we
will have unduly, and I think unwisely, restricted its function in antitrust cases.2 47
Judge Sloviter's comments apply equally to the majority approach to
attempted monopolization. The dangerous probability requirement is a judicially interposed technical obstacle preventing the jury from assessing the
effect of the defendant's conduct on competition. The majority approach
eviscerates the congressional mandate that the Sherman Act reach not only
monopolization but also attempts to monopolize. In addition, the majority
approach has prevented the development of a common law (similar to that
developed for the various Section 1 Sherman Act violations) identifying the
specific types and combinations of conduct, intent, market power, and market structure that may constitute an attempt to monopolize. That is, the
myriad of cases disposed of on dangerous probability grounds require no
searching examination of the defendant's conduct and no searching analysis
of that conduct's impact on competition.
The dangerous probability requirement not only disserves plaintiffs, it
also provides no guidance to businesses regarding the specific types of conduct that may (or may not) be subject to scrutiny or liability under Section
2.248 The current message is that anything goes as long as you do not already have a dominant market share. Because many modem markets are
virtually incapable of full-blown monopolization,24 9 the current state of the
247. Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 131 (Sloviter, J.,
dissenting).
248. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
249. For example, retail grocery sales in a metropolitan area. See, eag., Indiana Grocery, Inc.
v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th Cir. 1989).
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law permanently insulates virtually all single firm activity from the Sherman Act.
D. DangerousProbabilityof Success - The Myth of Overdeterrence
and Overenforcement
The standard answer to the elimination of the jury and the facts of the
case from attempt to monopolize litigation is that courts and juries are incapable of weighing and analyzing the competitive impact of sometimes complex business behavior. Thus, the risk of overenforeement and
overdeterrence, which would "chill" legitimate competitive behavior, is created. For example, Professor Bork notes that the "requirement of a dangerous probability of success is a valuable prophylactic rule, to prevent the law
from suppressing competition."25 0 Professors Areeda and Turner
elaborate:
[T]he final and most formidable reason for not applying [Section] 2
to relatively minor degrees of power is the potentially devastating
effect it could have on the very competition it is supposed to foster .... A general lowering of the required degree of power would
thus greatly increase the deterrent to conduct which on close analysis would turn out to be legitimately competitive. It would impose
great and probably unmeetable demands on the capacity of the enforcement process to define exclusionary conduct accurately and
precisely, and to reach appropriate results in a burgeoning variety
and number of individual cases. It would greatly increase the risk
that enforcement
costs would considerably exceed consumer welfare
1
gains.

25

Professor Cooper espouses similar sentiments:
The immediate consequence [of a mistake in judicial diagnosis] is
that desirable conduct may be forbidden by judicial decree. A less
immediate, but more pervasive, danger is that the uncertainties surrounding the process and criteria of judicial evaluation may deter
much competitive activity that even courts would have found
desirable.2 52
Even assuming that these arguments are true, they are, for the most
part, irrelevant. It is not for the courts to decide whether juries are capable
of distinguishing an attempt to monopolize from legitimate competitive be-

250. Debate, supra note 3, at 1441.
251. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 833d at 342.
252. Cooper, supra note 3, at 435; see also Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1413-14, 1416; International Distrib. Centers, 812 F.2d at 791; 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 1 833d, at

342; H.

HOVENKAMP,

supra note 2, § 6.1, at 159-60, § 6.3, at 165-66.
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havior. Congress, in enacting Section 2, has decreed that they are. As previously noted, attempt to monopolize is recognized as an offense separate
from monopolization, which is derived from and should be interpreted consistent with the general criminal law of attempt. The dangerous probability
of success requirement is derived from a misreading of the case in which it
was announced. It freezes the law of attempt to monopolize at an early,
and now long discredited, stage in the development of the general criminal
law of attempt. If courts now somehow justified this departure on some
inherent difference between an attempt to monopolize and other attempts, it
might be defensible. Courts have not, however, taken this approach. They
seldom mention, much less analyze, the doctrine's anomalous character.
Rather, the doctrine is justified as necessary to prevent nuisance litigation
and to prevent juries from deciding issues they arguably are incompetent to
decide. In effect, the courts and commentators question the wisdom of applying the antitrust laws to single firm conduct short of monopoly. That
decision, however, has already been made by Congress in favor of coverage,
when it proscribed antitrust liability for persons who "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States.... 2 5 3 The dangerous probability of success requirement is
simply a judicially imposed technical obstacle, which frustrates the public
policy judgments provided in Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Another response to the majority approach, which accords mere "perfunctory content" 254 to the attempt offense to prevent mistaken judicial
condemnation of "desirable competitive behavior, '255 is that such an approach, as Justice Stevens noted in another context, "exhibits little confidence in the judicial process as a means of ascertaining the truth., 256 For
example, Professor Cooper fears "[g]rave dangers of mistaken judicial diagnosis" arising from the "probability that judicial procedures, often resting
on incomplete data adduced by opposing advocates and evaluated by adversary experts, may provide too little understanding of the efficiencies resulting from rivalrous behavior."2 7 He fears the prospect of competitors'
"pathological" 2'5 8 misuse of antitrust through litigation "transparently
designed to shield against desirable, effective competition, ' 259 and states
that "any honest discussion of judicial competence to evaluate the competi253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (emphasis added).
Cooper, supra note 3, at 454.
Id. at 435.
Business Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 752 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Cooper, supra note 3, at 435.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 45 1.
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tive system" must recognize that juries must evaluate the desirability of
competitive conduct, a process which "must aggravate the burdens of uncertainty imposed on business planning and result in arbitrary differences in
deciding cases." 2 " This approach exhibits little faith in antitrust law generally. In enacting the Sherman Act almost one hundred years ago, Congress
delegated to the federal courts the responsibility of developing a common
law of antitrust to preserve and promote competition and prevent
monopoly.
As long ago noted by Chief Justice Hughes, the Sherman Act is a "charter of freedom" with "a generality and adaptability comparable to that
found to be desirable in constitutional provisions.' 2 61 No one said it would
be easy for the courts to apply the extremely general language of the Sherman Act to the wide array of fact situations to which litigants have asked
that it be applied. Nevertheless, Congress has dictated that the Sherman
Act, a "comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade,"2'62 be developed and applied as law in the context of litigated cases. This context is inhabited by
"opposing advocates" who propose "incomplete data" evaluated by "adversary experts," which provide "too little understanding of the efficiencies resulting from rivalrous behavior." "Pathological" cases may indeed be filed
in bad faith by plaintiffs seeking to use the law to shield themselves from
competition. In addition, the desirability of the defendant's conduct must
be evaluated by the jury, an unpredictable body that often makes mistakes.
In the final analysis, however, all of these concerns are irrelevant. Congress has decreed that antitrust be developed as law. It is not for courts or
commentators to stifle the development of that law by paternalistically asserting that the judicial system is incompetent to judge the competitive impact of single firm conduct short of monopoly. The majority approach is
particularly debilitating because it is a blunderbuss, banishing most plaintiffs from the courthouse without analysis of the effect of varying types of
defendant's conduct. Such analysis would develop a common law that provides guidance to later courts and juries regarding the limits of acceptable
competitive behavior, and thereby would reduce the risk of "mistaken judicial diagnosis" for future cases. The majority approach essentially argues
that because the courts are incompetent to judge competitive behavior, we
must withhold from them the very evidence that might make them
competent.
260. Id. at 452.
261. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
262. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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The judicial incompetence argument also is essentially a conclusory, generic, all-purpose defendant's antitrust argument. One either does or does
not believe that courts are competent to create detailed rules governing
competitors' conduct without stifling competition. Under the pro-defendant bias, if one wants to insulate a practice from antitrust liability, he simply states that antitrust scrutiny may chill legitimate competitive behavior.
Of course, no evidence of actual procompetitive effect is required, and
plaintiff's evidence of anticompetitive effect is withheld from the jury, for
such issues are too complex for juries to understand and evaluate. As a
result, the facts of the case are withheld from the jury and the case is resolved in a summary manner in favor of the defendant.26 3
Another problem with the majority approach is its slavish concern for
the protection of legitimate competitive behavior. In fact, the majority is so
concerned with protection of such behavior that it is willing to adopt a rule
of per se legality for all conduct, legitimate or not, of a single firm not already close to monopoly. True legitimate competitive behavior encompasses a virtually infinite range of conduct, involving production, pricing,
product design, distribution, marketing, advertising, and service, any one of
which might be used to divert business from a competitor or increase profitability. Certainly, a line of antitrust cases outlining certain reasonably specific classes of conduct that are suspect under Section 2 will not foreclose
even a fraction of the competitive alternatives available to a business in any
industry. Even if sued under Section 2, the defendant can always introduce
evidence to prove a legitimate business justification for its conduct (or, if it
is ambitious, that less restrictive alternatives do not exist or are impractical), an exercise not required by the majority approach. The majority approach is preoccupied with dangerous probability of success and legitimate
competitive behavior as a monolith including all conduct. As a result, cases
are prejudged, development of the law is frozen, blatant anticompetitive
conduct escapes antitrust scrutiny, and no guidance is provided to business,
except that anything goes.
Proponents of the majority approach also argue that if dangerous
probability is not an element of the attempt offense, the offense could be
directed at any general business tort or unfair practice - things properly
dealt with by other laws." Predictably, this concern is seldom accompa263. This approach underlies both the majority approach to attempted monopolization and
the current judicial approach to price-related dealer terminations outlined in Monsanto, 465 U.S.
752, and Business Elecs. Corps, 485 U.S. 717. For an extended discussion, see Roszkowski, supra
note 243.

264. Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1413; InternationalDistrib. Centers, 812 F.2d at 791; 3 P.
833d, at 341; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.5, at 168;

AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2,
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nied by any articulation of specific state remedies that are available to plaintiffs banished from the courthouse by the dangerous probability
requirement. In this event possible availability of state tort remedies is irrelevant. State law does not preempt the Sherman Act. In enacting the
Sherman Act, Congress articulated a strong federal policy favoring promotion of competition and prevention of monopoly. Indeed, Sherman Act
policy has long been accorded virtually constitutional significance. The fact
that some unspecified state tort or statutory doctrine might provide some
sort of remedy in some, but certainly not all, circumstances addressed by
the Sherman Act is no excuse for a wholesale judicial abdication of the
congressionally dictated responsibility to develop and provide a federal
remedy.
Even if one assumes that the prospect of chilling legitimate competitive
behavior or converting Section 2 into a general business tort statute justifies
a circumspect judicial approach to attempt to monopolize, the dangerous
probability of success requirement is clearly not the remedy. As previously
noted, the requirement has retarded the development of a body of case law
that would aid courts and businesses in distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate conduct. That is, each case decided on dangerous probability
grounds is the judicial system's lost opportunity to define the limits of acceptable behavior. The dangerous probability requirement is an easily applied expedient device which effectively rids the court system of
troublesome cases without the difficult task of analyzing the competitive
impact of the defendant's activities. Professor Twerski's caution concerning
the comparative negligence doctrine is equally applicable to the dangerous
probability requirement:
The problem with comparative negligence is that it is the great
compromiser. It permits a court the luxury of evading fundamental
policy questions, and once it is introduced it has a life of its own
which blinds courts to the policy questions which they might otherwise be required to face.265
The additional problem, of course, with dangerous probability as a great
compromiser is that the compromise always results in victory for the
defendant.
To allay any legitimate fear that eliminating the dangerous probability
requirement will turn Section 2 into a general business tort or unfair praccf. Scranton Constr. Co. v. Litton Indus. Leasing Corp., 494 F.2d 778, 783 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
265. Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault - Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297, 346 (1977).
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tices act, or chill legitimate business conduct, courts should carefully confine the attempt claim, consistent with its criminal law roots, to conduct
which strongly corroborates an intent to achieve monopoly power through
illegitimate means.266Thfoow
The following material provides a brief discussion of
the types of conduct that perhaps should subject a defendant to attempt to
monopolize liability, and the varying importance of market definition and
market share in evaluating that conduct. The classifications are merely suggestive of a possible approach; the common law must do its work, and
courts will struggle as they attempt to draw the line in difficult and borderline cases. They have eighty-five years of catching up to do.
VI.

CONDUCT STRONGLY CORROBORATING AN

INTENT TO MONOPOLIZE
267
Under the approach to attempted monopolization proposed above,
certain types of conduct are so inherently anticompetitive that they facially
evidence an intent to monopolize or acquire the benefits of monopoly pricing through cartel-like behavior.268 Such conduct should constitute an attempt to monopolize without inquiry into market evidence or the
defendant's actual ability to achieve monopoly power. The conduct itself
strongly corroborates an intent to achieve monopoly power through illegitimate means. This approach is similar to that used forperse Section 1 violations, which automatically condemn certain combinations or agreements in
restraint of trade, without inquiry into actual anticompetitive consequences.2 69 With respect to more ambiguous types of conduct, an analysis
of the purpose and competitive effects of the acts (analogous to the rule-ofreason analysis of most Section 1 violations) 270 is required to determine
whether the conduct strongly corroborates an intent to monopolize.

A.

Per Se Attempted Monopolization

The courts should develop a narrow list of categories of conduct that
strongly corroborate an intent to monopolize, without requiring any market
evidence. Although courts should allow direct evidence of the defendant's
purpose to clarify whether the conduct actually falls into one of these per se
266. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, § 51(b), at 138, § 52, at 140.
267. See supra Part IV.D.
268. A cartel is an agreement among all competitors within a market to reduce output and
raise prices in order to attain profits that a true monopolist could achieve. See generally H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 4.1; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, §§ 59-62.
269. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 4.4; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, §§ 63-72.
270. See sources cited supra note 269.
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categories, the defendant's conduct also should strongly corroborate that
purpose. 27 '
1. Per Se Violations of Section 1
The courts have already articulated various categories of conduct that
are so inherently anticompetitive and evidencing an intent to attain the advantages of monopoly power that they should be facially condemned -per
se Section 1 violations.2 72 Section 1 violations, however, require concerted
activity. The same policy that condemns certain combinations or agreements under Section 1 also should condemn unilateral activity directed at
forming such a combination or agreement, or the same substantive results
as such a combination or agreement. 273 This approach would help fill the
gap between Sections 1 and 2 that the dangerous probability of success requirement produces.274 For example, the essence of monopoly power is the
power to control price.275 Price fixing is one of the primary tools a cartel
uses to attain control over price. Courts, therefore, condemn as per se Section 1 violations agreements among competitors to fix prices, whether or
not they possess enough collective market power to make their price-fixing
scheme successful. The agreement itself evidences the cartel members' intent to attain the benefits of monopoly pricing.2 76 If a price-fixing agreement, standing alone, is dangerous enough to evidence an intent to obtain
monopoly power, courts should treat unilateral activity designed to achieve
control over price as strongly corroborative of an intent to monopolize
without requiring any market evidence, or evidence of chance of success.
271. Professors Areeda and Turner also propose a limited set of per se attempts to monopolize. They would limit these violations to conduct:
(1) which is totally unrelated to competition on the merits-that is, lacking any plausible
claim to redeeming virtue; (2) which clearly implies the presence or prospect of some degree of durable market power-as, for example, conduct not likely to be rationally undertaken by a firm without such power or the hope of attaining it through the challenged
conduct; and (3) which has potentially significant exclusionary effects in the generality of
cases-in that there is a clear and direct causal connection between the conduct and the
power.
3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, %820, at 312-13. Such conduct clearly would strongly
corroborate an intent to monopolize.
272. See sources cited supra note 269.
273. The Ninth Circuit approach to dangerous probability of success reached the same result
as that proposed here. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Professors Areeda and Turner
also conclude that unilateral conduct directed at the same objects as those condemned by per se
§ 1 treatment should beperse attempts to monopolize. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supranote 2,

836a.
274. See supra Part V.A.
275. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
276. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, §§ 73-78.
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An excellent example of such conduct is provided by the Eighth Circuit
case United States v. Empire Gas Corp.2 7 7 The evidence in that case established unambiguously that the defendant had used price cuts and threats of
price cuts to coerce, discipline, and intimidate its competitors into raising
their prices to a level ensuring the defendant sufficient profits.2 78 The
Eighth Circuit thought that this evidence alone established the defendant's
specific intent to achieve monopoly power (the power to control prices or
exclude competition) through anticompetitive conduct. 7 9 By finding conduct strongly corroborating an intent to monopolize, the court should have

had no difficulty imposing liability for attempted monopolization. Nevertheless, the court found no dangerous probability of success because the
defendant's competitors did not accede to the coercion.28 0 Had the competitors acceded to the defendant's pressure, the defendant would have been

277. 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
278. Id. at 302.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 305. Contrast this case with United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d
1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert dismissed, 474 U.S. 1001 (1985), discussed supra note 166. There, the
court found dangerous probability by looking at the joint market shares of the defendant and the
solicited competitor and characterizing the solicitation as the last proximate act before actual
monopolization. Id. at 1118-19. The analysis proposed here would require only that the defendant's conduct strongly corroborate an intent to achieve control over prices through illegitimate
conduct, regardless of actual ability to obtain control over prices. The Empire and American
Airlines cases also are discussed in 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 836.1 (P. Areeda
& H. Hovenkamp Supp. 1988), and in Ponsoldt, supra note 3, at 1130-39. For other cases alleging
attempted monopolization through price fixing, see Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores,
Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1415-16 (7th Cir. 1989) (price cuts to intimidate and discipline competitors
into raising prices); Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 745 F.2d 248, 261 (3d Cir.
1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985); Olsen v. Progressive Music Supply, Inc., 703 F.2d 432,
435 (10th Cir. 1893), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley,
300 F.2d 561, 562 (10th Cir. 1961), cert dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962).
The same analysis would apply to unilateral attempts to divide geographic or product markets
among competitors, a per se violation of § 1 if done through agreement. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, §§ 79-82. For cases alleging attempted monopolization through horizontal
market division, see United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 299 (8th Cir. 1976), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); Union Carbide, 300 F.2d at 562.
The same analysis would apply to unilateral attempts to coerce resale price maintenance, aper
se violation of § I if done through an agreement. See generally, L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3,
§§ 131-41. For cases alleging attempted monopolization through resale price maintenance, see
Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1094 (1977); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 814 (9th Cir. 1976), cert
denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 475 (9th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
Because of Supreme Court precedent, although concerted refusals to deal are per se § 1 violations, unilateral refusals to deal, even to coerce resale price maintenance, are not per se illegal.
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Therefore, refusals to deal are discussed in
conjunction with ambiguous conduct, infra notes 301-02 and accompanying text.
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guilty of price fixing. The defendant is no less blameworthy because they
resisted.
2.

Predatory Pricing

Predatory pricing is one of the most common forms of conduct alleged
as attempted monopolization. 28 1 A firm engaged in predatory pricing sets
prices below cost in order to drive competitors out of business. Once competitors are eliminated, the defendant can reap the benefits of monopoly
pricing and recoup losses from its former below-cost pricing. 2 82 The only
rational reason for pricing below cost is to eventually gain monopoly power
through the illegitimately exclusionary effects of the below-cost pricing.28 3
Thus, if a plaintiff establishes that a defendant prices below cost, then the
court need not inquire into the defendant's market power or chance of success. The conduct alone strongly corroborates intent to achieve monopoly
power through illegitimately exclusionary conduct.
Courts which require that a defendant engaged in predatory pricing
284
have some market power to establish dangerous probability of success
are extremely misguided. A firm does not need power in a particular market to launch a potentially successful predatory pricing scheme. It needs
only total resources (perhaps from other businesses or a corporate parent)
which allow it to sustain losses until other firms are eliminated. Thus, the
only rational threshold question relevant to the defendant's intent to

281. See, eg., Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1413; McGahee v. Northern Propane Gas Co.,
858 F.2d 1487, 1493 (1lth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 4990 U.S. 1084 (1989); Kelco Disposal, Inc. v.
Browning Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc., 845 F.2d 404, 407 (2d Cir. 1988); Shoppin' Bag of
Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Cos., 783 F.2d 159, 161 (10th Cir. 1986); C.E. Servs., Inc. v. Control Data
Corp., 759 F.2d 1241, 1247 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037 (1985); National Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 1985); Sunshine Books, Ltd. v.
Temple Univ., 697 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir. 1982); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1031 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); California
Steel & Tube v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 650 F.2d 1001, 1004 (9th Cir. 1981); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v.
Codding, 615 F.2d 830, 845 (9th Cir. 1980); Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismark Tribune Co., 493
F.2d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1974), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974) (blanketing of free samples);
Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 205 (5th Cir. 1969).
282. On predatory pricing, see generally H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, §§ 6.7-6.11.
283. There is significant controversy regarding the proper test for predatory pricing. See
McGahee, 858 F.2d 1487; 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, supra note 2, 711; H. HOVENKAMP,
supra note 2, §§ 6.8-6.9; Areeda & Turner, PredatoryPricingand Related PracticesUnder Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975). This controversy is beyond the scope of this
article. Once predatory pricing is established under the applicable test, however, it should be
condemned on its face.
284. See, eg., Indiana Grocery, 868 F.2d at 1414; Shoppin'Bag of Pueblo, 783 F.2d at 161-62;
CliffFood Stores, 417 F.2d at 207.
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achieve monopoly power through predatoiy pricing is the defendant's total
resources relative to those of its competitors.2 8 5
Although barriers to entry are generally necessary for a successful predatory pricing scheme,2 826 requiring the presence of such barriers when the
defendant embarks upon the scheme is too stringent.28 7 If a court allows
predatory pricing in the guise of low barriers to entry, the threat of retaliation against new entrants through predatory pricing becomes a reality - a
2 8
significant barrier to entry in itself. 1
Predatory pricing is such a potent anticompetitive device that proof of
below cost pricing by a firm with more resources than its competitors
should be sufficient, in itself, to sustain an attempted monopolization judgment. Such conduct alone strongly corroborates an intent to monopolize.
3.

Fraudulent Procurement of a Patent

In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp.,289 the Supreme Court acknowledged that enforcement of a fraudulently procured patent could constitute an attempt to monopolize, but deferred its decision regarding whether it should be a per se attempt to
monopolize. Under the principles outlined in this article, such conduct
should indeed be a per se attempt to monopolize.
To state a claim based upon fraudulent procurement, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant "knowingly and willfully misrepresented facts to
the Patent Office."' 290 This showing alone evidences the illegitimate nature
of the defendant's conduct. Further, the possession of a patent, in itself,is a
type of legal monopoly. 29 ' Thus, a defendant who tries to attain a legally
protected monopoly through fraudulent means should be liable for an attempt to monopolize without inquiry into the relevant market.2 9 2 Proof of
285. Professors Areeda and Turner recognize this fact and, therefore, propose that courts
might properly require a plaintiff in a predatory pricing case initially to prove that the defendant's
resources greatly exceed those of rivals before examining prices and costs. 3 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 2, T 836a, at 351, 353. But, like the analysis proposed here, Professors Areeda
and Turner would make predatory pricing a per se attempt to monopoloze. Id.
286. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.10, at 181-82.
287. Cf. Indiana Grocery, 864 F.2d at 1414-15; 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2,
836b, at 354.
288. See supra notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
289. 382 U.S. 172 (1965), discussed supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
290. Id. at 177.
291. The ownership of a patent has been held to establish at least prima facie evidence of
market control. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
292. Professors Areeda and Turner agree that enforcement of a fraudulently procured patent
and reckless patent infringement suits should be per se attempts to monopolize. 3 P. AREEDA &
D. TURNER, supra note 2, 836b; see also Cooper, supra note 3, at 416-17.
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fraudulent procurement of a patent, or enforcement or threatened enforcement of a fraudulently procured patent strongly corroborates, on its own,
29 3
an intent to monopolize.
4.

Sham Litigation

A line of Supreme Court cases 294 have established the principle that
most efforts to influence governmental bodies, including institution of litigation before courts and administrative agencies, are immune from antitrust
liability. This so-called Noerr-Penningtondoctrine has, however, developed
a sham exception removing the immunity for a defendant who knowingly
initiates litigation that is baseless or a sham. 9
Such conduct clearly has no redeeming virtues. One of the incidents of
monopoly power is the power to exclude competitors.2 9 6 Sham litigation is
a particularly effective way of harassing and excluding potential competitors. Whereas other forms of predation, such as predatory pricing, are very
expensive to the predator, requiring large losses for extended periods of
time, sham litigation is relatively inexpensive. The litigation costs of the
predator are usually negligible compared to the markets at stake. The
predator, therefore, does not need a large resource base from which to
launch an exclusion campaign based on sham litigation.2 97 In addition, the
victim may be prevented from operating at all until the litigation is concluded, a very damaging prospect, especially for fledgling companies.2 98
Because of these particularly pernicious features of sham litigation, a
plaintiff should be allowed to state a claim for attempted monopolization
based on sham litigation without proving that the defendant possesses any
293. For cases alleging attempt to monopolize based upon fraudulent procurement of a patent, see American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 562 F.2d 365
(6th Cir. 1977); Oetiker v. Werke, 556 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v.
Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972);

Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1022
& 1032 (1973); ef. CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842 (lst Cir. 1985) (bad faith and baseless
threats of trade secret enforcement), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
294. The doctrine originated in the cases of Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965). Subsequent cases affirming the so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine include Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973) and 417 U.S. 901 (1974); California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); Walker Process Equip., Inc., 382 U.S.
172.

295. See, e.g., Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 786 F.2d 424, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986).
296. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
297. Neumann, 786 F.2d at 427 & n.2.
298. Id. See also Ernest W. Hahn, 615 F.2d 830.
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particular degree of market power. The conduct is sufficiently harmful and
devoid of any legitimate justification that it evidences, on its face, an intent
to exclude competitors by illegitimate means.2 99
5.

Other Unambiguous Conduct

The preceding discussion certainly does not exhaust the possibilities for
per se attempts to monopolize. Any conduct treated as such, however,
should be unique in its ability to strongly corroborate an intent to achieve
monopoly power without inquiry into the relevant market. These acts
should be particularly potent in their ability to exclude competitors or, in
themselves, imply the existence or hope of attaining market power. 3 0
B. Ambiguous Conduct
Most types of conduct alleged as attempted monopolization are not
unambiguously anticompetitive nor do they unambiguously supply an inference of power or the hope of attaining it. Such conduct must be examined
in light of the defendant's purposes and the anticompetitive effects of the
conduct in the relevant market. For these types of conduct, the courts
should continue to require plaintiffs to present market evidence as part of
the primafacie case of attempted monopolization. The courts should not,
however, necessarily require the same strict market definition required in a
monopolization case. Also, courts should recognize that some conduct is
more harmful than other conduct and, therefore, be careful not to set the
threshold level of market power for attempt liability too high. The defendant must simply possess sufficient power to strongly corroborate the allegation that the defendant is attempting to gain monopoly power through
anticompetitive means - an issue that should be left to the trier of fact to
determine.
To illustrate how market evidence can clarify the purpose and effect of
otherwise ambiguous conduct, assume the most common attempt to monopolize fact pattern: refusals to deal or dealer terminations. Concerted

299. For cases alleging attempts to monopolize based upon sham litigation, see Rickards v.
Canine Eye Registration Found., Inc., 783 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 851
(1986); Neumann, 786 F.2d 424; Ernest W. Hahn, 615 F.2d 830; Associated Radio Serv. Co. v.
Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
300. See, eg., Syufy Enters. v. American Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1986)
(defendant purchased clearances, giving exclusive right to show motion pictures in certain geographic area, clearly in excess of clearances needed for legitimate competitive reasons), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 1034 (1987).
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refusals to deal, or group boycotts, are per se violations of Section 1. 30' In
the classic group boycott, a group of competitors agree to concertedly refuse to deal with suppliers or buyers who continue to deal with the boycott
victim - one of their competitors. The group boycott is a powerful tool of
the cartel to exclude or eliminate competitors who undercut their monopoly
pricing. Although the concerted nature of the conduct supplies an inference of power or the hope of attaining it for the group boycott, such an
inference is much more dangerous for unilateral refusals to deal. On its
own, a unilateral refusal to deal could be motivated by a number of legitimate purposes. Therefore, evidence of purpose and effects is necessary to
characterize the unilateral refusal to deal as anticompetitive conduct
designed to achieve monopoly power.3 °2
For example, in General Industries Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp.,303
the plaintiff was a regional distributor of pet supplies, who had been terminated as a dealer in the defendant's products. Because plaintiff's dealership
agreement did not require it to deal exclusively in defendant's products, 3°4
the plaintiff started carrying a competing brand. Some time thereafter, the
defendant terminated plaintiff as a dealer and argued that the plaintiff was
terminated because it paid other manufacturers on a more timely basis than
the defendant 30 5 - an arguably legitimate reason for termination. However, the fact that the defendant had a seventy-five to ninety percent retail
market share in pet supplies 30 6 provided an alternative motive for the termination - that the defendant was using its vast market power to deprive the
competing manufacturer of sources of distribution for its products.
Other evidence corroborated that this deprivation was indeed the defendant's motive. For example, defendant changed its credit terms with the
plaintiff only after plaintiff began dealing in the competing products.3 °7 Defendant threatened plaintiff that unless plaintiff stopped dealing in competing products, defendant would put the plaintiff out of business, and then
301. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, §§ 10.1-10.3; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3,
§§ 83-92.
302. In United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), the Supreme Court said that
"[i]n the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly" a person may freely "exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." Id. at 307. However, in
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), the Court held that a newspaper monopolist's refusal to accept advertising from those who also advertised on a local radio station was
an attempt to monopolize. See also Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585 (1985).
303. 810 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1987).
304. Id. at 798.
305. Id. at 799.
306. Id. at 806.
307. Id. at 804.
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acted on this threat by directly soliciting plaintiff's customers.3" 8 Thus,
what initially might have appeared to be a legitimate reason to refuse to
deal with the plaintiff (credit problems), on closer examination of the defendant's market power and direct evidence of intent, turned out to be an
attempt to use already-existing market power to coercively eliminate a
competitor.3 9
A manufacturer with a negligible market share could never hope to
carry out such a scheme. The fact that consumers wanted defendantfs
products made it possible for the defendant to coerce dealers through
threatened termination. Thus, the market share evidence helped clarify
that the termination was part of an anticompetitive scheme to eliminate a
competitor and gain monopoly power. The case also illustrates that an extremely rigorous definition of relevant market is not necessary in attempt
cases. The market evidence at trial was not documented statistical evidence, but merely observations by persons familiar with the market.3 10 All
the trier of fact needed to know to clarify the defendant's intention in this
case was that defendant was a dominant player in the market who could
succeed in a campaign of coercion designed to eliminate a competitor.
As with unilateral refusals to deal, most conduct alleged as attempted
monopolization is ambiguous and can only be understood by analyzing it in
light of its purpose and competitive effects, analogous to rule-of-reason
analysis under Section 1.3 11 Some forms of conduct will survive scrutiny
more easily than others. For example, conduct lawful for a monopolist also
should be lawful for one who does not possess monopoly power.3 2 Conduct that can make no contribution to monopoly power or that is aggressive
competition on the merits should not be condemned as attempted monopolization. Such conduct does not strongly corroborate intent to
monopolize.3 13
308. Id. at 802.
309. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment, entered on a jury verdict, for the
plaintiff. Id. at 797.
310. Id. at 806.
311. For a discussion of various types of conduct which often are alleged as attempted monopolization, see 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2,
825-30.
312. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, 828a; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, § 6.6,
at 170-71.
313. For example, hiring employees away from a competitor, if unaccompanied by bribery or
coercion, has usually been held legal. For cases alleging attempted monopolization based upon
hiring away employees, see International Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d
786 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987); Adjusters Replace-A-Car, Inc. v. Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 735 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160 (1985); Morning
Pioneer, 493 F.2d 383; cf. Associated Radio Serv., 624 F.2d at 1354-56 (hiring away employees
accompanied by bribes to act against former employers' interests was actionable); Bonjorno v.
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CONCLUSION

The courts' use of dangerous probability of success as an element of the
attempted monopolization offense under Section 2 of the Sherman Act is
justified neither by Supreme Court precedent nor by the substantive law of
criminal attempts. Interpreting the attempt offense consistently with modem criminal attempt law makes the attempted monopolization offense a
much more effective antitrust enforcement tool. A modem criminal law
approach returns the courts' attention to the appropriate issue in attempt
cases - the defendant's conduct rather than the defendant's market share.
It also provides a workable analytical framework for attempted monopolization claims, which is capable of distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate conduct. If consistently applied, this framework would develop a
case law that would provide guidance both to courts and businesses regarding the limits of acceptable behavior, guidance that is sorely lacking under
existing law. Finally, returning the attempted monopolization offense to its
criminal law roots closes the gap in Sherman Act enforcement that presently allows blatantly anticompetitive conduct to escape antitrust scrutiny if
done unilaterally.

Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1984) (hiring away key employee one
fact supporting judgment for actual monopolization).

In addition, aggressive research and development and product design and development usually
do not support an attempted monopolization claim. For cases holding such conduct to be legitimate, see Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986); Foremost Pro Color,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984);
California Computer Prods., Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979).

